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THE HATCH ACT
"The latent causes offaction are thus sown in the nature of man."1
"Man is by nature a political animal. ,,2
"Good government is an empire of laws. ,3
In the wake of a disputed presidential election, the departing president
makes appointments and difficult-to-reverse decisions in his final days,
leaving an uproar behind as he leaves the capital. During the run-up to the
election and afterward, partisans of each side make rash predictions and
wild charges about the other. As a result of the skirmishes, careers-and
even lives-are destroyed.
While this may well describe recent events, this catalogue of horrors
actually captures the events of the 1800 campaign for president. An ally
enlisted by Thomas Jefferson to offer negative commentary on President
Adams called the president "a hideous hermaphroditical character.
' 4
Partisans of President Adams responded that victory for Jefferson would
lead "the soil [to] be soaked with blood, and the nation black with crimes. '
The government workforce is not immune from this partisanship. Adams
admittedly sought appointees based in part on their "political principles.
' 6
Jefferson later wrote that he perceived Adams' "midnight appointments" in
the waning hours of his presidency as a personal slight, damaging
Jefferson's attempts to implement his preferred policies.7 Famously, after
the election, Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr engaged in a duel fatal to
Hamilton, and fatal to the political career of Burr.8
These examples reflect a passion for partisanship in the American
founding era that would seem to eclipse any idealism. A partisan political
atmosphere encourages angry political debate and political manipulation of
the bureaucracy. Still, the founders wrote about and reflected on
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 10 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford University Press, 1995).
3. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT: APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF
THE COLONIES (1776).
4. Colin Gustafson, Shop Talk, ROLL CALL, June 17, 2004, at 9; see JOSEPH J. ELLIS,
FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION (2000) (providing an account of
the partisan wrangling).
5. ELLIS, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1623 n.25
(1984), citing H. MCBAIN, DE WrIr CLINTON AND THE ORIGIN OF THE SPOILS SYSTEM IN
NEW YORK 58 (1907).
7. Jefferson privately complained that Adams made appointments in his final days as
president "from among my most ardent political enemies, from whom no faithful
cooperation could ever be expected." Id. at 1623 n.27 (citing letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Abigail Adams (June 13, 1804)).
8. See ELLIS, supra note 4, at 40-43.
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humanity's tendency toward faction, and evinced a certain faith in the
ability of the constitutional structure to allow for it without becoming
contaminated by it.
Despite the feeling that it has reached its zenith of late, partisanship is
as much a part of the American landscape as winter snow in the Midwest
and sunshine punctuated by hurricanes in Florida. Unlike with the weather,
however, Americans have been doing something about partisanship in the
federal workforce since the Washington administration, with a series of
laws and policies aimed at cutting off the use of the government workforce
for partisan gain.
The Hatch Act is the primary means for limiting partisanship within
the federal bureaucracy. The Act limits the partisan political activity of
most federal employees and state and local employees employed in
connection with federal loans or grants.
This Article traces the development of the Hatch Act (the Act),
detailing the long history of complaints about partisanship within the
government and various attempts to limit it by law. In limiting the effects
of partisanship, the Act applied the insights of The Federalist Papers on the
dangers of faction to changed methods of governance. "The latent causes
of faction are thus sown in the nature of man," James Madison wrote. 9 The
Federalist Papers defended the constitutional system as striking a balance
between this tendency towards partisanship and a more noble political
nature of man. The passage of the original Hatch Act reflected concern,
born of experience, that permitting government employees to participate
openly in partisan politics would create dangers for subordinate employees,
the rights of the public, and public regard for the government. Today, due
to the 1993 amendments to the Hatch Act, government employees are
permitted to engage in partisan activity while off duty.
This Article will review the history, provisions, constitutionality,
rationale, and recent enforcement of the Hatch Act and previous similar
legislation. The United States Office of Special Counsel (OSC) engages in
outreach programs to educate employees about the Hatch Act. Employees
who have difficulty understanding the legal regime of the Act can, by
statute, obtain an individualized advisory opinion from the OSC. The
regulations might benefit from some revision to account for changes in
technology, particularly e-mail. Although a variety of rationales have been
advanced in favor of the Hatch Act before the Court, the Act's protection
of the public's First Amendment rights have been somewhat neglected.
The Act promotes goals similar to those advocated by the authors of The
Federalist Papers: protecting government employees and the public from a
politicized bureaucracy. The 1993 amendments to the Act reflect a shift in
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 79.
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policy: rather than imposing a far-reaching ban on employees' partisan
political activity, the Act is designed to control abuses. The Supreme
Court's analysis of the Hatch Act and similar laws has developed, from
early decisions giving great deference to determinations by Congress and
the president regarding the management of the government workforce, to
more recent opinions suggesting increased judicial scrutiny of the Act's
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of employees. This Article also
reviews the number of matters investigated by the OSC, which investigates
and prosecutes alleged Hatch Act violations. The level of complaints and
prosecutions was only slightly affected by the 1993 amendments; more
recently, the number of complaints has been on the rise. This trend
promises to continue with increased use of high-speed technology,
outsourcing, and increased partisanship. Vigorous and consistent
enforcement, along with a steady regimen of education and outreach, will
stem this tide.
I. THE SPOILS SYSTEM, PARTISANSHIP AND THE HATCH ACT THROUGH
HISTORY
Debates over restrictions on the political activities of government
employees to ensure effective governance date from the beginning of U.S.
history. George Washington is said to have been concerned about the
politicization of the civil service.1°  In 1791, the House rejected an
amendment that would have limited the political activities of inspectors of
distilled spirits due to concerns that "this clause will muzzle the mouths of
freemen, and take away their use of reason."11 In 1801, President Thomas
Jefferson observed "with dissatisfaction officers of the General
Government taking on various occasions active parts in the elections of
public functionaries, whether of the General or State Governments,"
according to a federal circular. 2 The document stressed that government
officers retained their right to vote, but cautioned that they were expected
not to "attempt to influence the votes of others nor take any part in the
business of electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of
the Constitution and [their] duties to it."' 3
In the mid-nineteenth century, political patronage in the government
10. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES, No. 20,95TH CONGRESS,
HATCH ACT REVISION 1 (1978) [hereinafter HATCH ACT REVISION].
11. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1877 (Jan. 21, 1791), cited in H.R. REP. No. 103-16, at 6
(1993).
12. 10 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 98 (1898).
13. Id. at 99.
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became the focus of a lengthy national debate. 14 Spurred on in part by the
1881 assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office seeker,
15
Congress passed the Pendleton Act in 1883 to create a merit-based federal
workforce for the positions covered by the act. 6 It ended the heyday of the
federal government "spoils system," in which government sinecures were
awarded to political allies after winning an election, and provided that no
federal employee should be coerced to contribute to a political fund or to
provide any political service.17 The Act authorized the president to issue
rules in furtherance of the Act and established the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), predecessor to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(Board).18 CSC Rule I, issued by President Arthur, focused on preventing
coercion by government employees.19
In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, a former CSC member,2°
extended the Rule I ban from coercive situations to employees' voluntarily
,,21taking an "active part in political management or in political campaigns.
The CSC's opinions developed the legal meaning of this rule "in the mode
of the common law" in the succeeding decades.22
A. The Hatch Act
Since its original enactment in 1939, the Hatch Act has been amended
to apply to state and local officials working in connection with federal
14. See, e.g., ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883 vii (1968).
Civil service reform was a live political issue in the post-Civil War United
States. It made and broke presidents, would-be presidents, and a number of
lesser political figures.... One [reform advocate] cried out as he died, 'I have
spent my life in fighting the spoils system,' while another referred to fellow
reformers as 'saints.'
Id. at vii (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 209. The assassin, Charles Guiteau, believed himself to be entitled to a
political position on account of his political campaigning. He further believed that he was
defending the country by making Arthur president. He is generally believed to have been
insane.
16. Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883); see also HOOGENBOOM,
supra note 14, at 236-52 (explaining the reasons behind the Act's passage).
17. Civil Service Act § 2. The Act stated that "no person in the public service is for
that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any
political service" and that "no person in said service has any right to use his official
authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body." Id.
18. Id. § 12.
19. 8 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 161 (1898).
20. HATCH ACT REVISION, supra note 10, at 1.
21. Exec. Order No. 642, reprinted in 1 PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 61 (1944).
22. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 559 (1973).
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funds and to allow more off-duty political activity for government workers.
1. Original Enactment
The Hatch Act was enacted in 1939.23 Taking its name from longtime
civil service reform advocate Senator Carl Hatch of New Mexico, the Act
codified and extended the Rule I ban on partisan political activity.
The Act codified the Rule I ban on taking an active part in political
management or political campaigns 24 and extended it from the "'classified'
civil service" (roughly seventy percent of the one million federal
employees) to nearly all employees.25 The 1939 ban on use of "official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with" an election
26
remains intact today,27 as does, in somewhat altered form, the ban on
28soliciting campaign funds from anyone with business before the agency.
The original Act prohibited coercing votes29 and promising a government
position or withholding government relief funds as compensation or
punishment for political activity.3° Penalties for violation of the criminal
provisions of the Act included fines and imprisonment. 3' For violation of
the ban on use of authority, however, the penalty was removal from
office. 32
The Act was passed in response to controversies over coercion of
political donations from federal employees and the misuse of federal funds
in the 1936 and 1938 campaigns. 33 The debate was intense on both sides.
23. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1508, 7321-7326 (1939).
24. Id. § 9(a).
25. Henry Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 510, 511 (1962).
Rose wrote, prior to the Letter Carriers decision, that the Act incorporated a large number
of inscrutable and sometimes flawed CSC decisions and advocated repealing the provision
of the Act adopting previous CSC decisions into law. Id. at 525. In Letter Carriers,
however, the Supreme Court held that the Act adopted a CSC restatement of its rules rather
than every prior ruling. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 572-75.
26. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, § 9(a).
27. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7323(a)(1), 1501(a)(1) (West 2004).
28. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1502(a)(2), 7323(a)(2) (West 2004).
29. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, § 1.
30. Id. §§ 3, 4. Promising employment or threatening to deprive a person of
employment in order to coerce contributions to campaigns remains prohibited by criminal
law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 601-602 (West 2004).
31. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, § 8.
32. Id. § 9(b).
33. See, e.g., 84 CONG. REc. 9602-03 (1939) (statement of Rep. Rees) (focusing on the
misuse of funds intended for relief); see also id. at 9598-99 (statement of Rep. Taylor)
(describing a Works Progress Administration superintendent in Knoxville, Tennessee, who
demanded political contributions from his workers, "[e]ven destitute women on sewing
projects," and fundraising campaign operatives who demanded exorbitant sums for virtually
20051
232 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW . [Vol. 7:2
One congressman said, "No patriotic American can read this report [on
recent campaign practices], detailing a sordid debauchery of the ballot
hitherto unknown in this country, without a feeling of deep resentment and
without a blush of shame. 34 Opponents expressed equally strong views on
the restrictions:
You have heard a great deal of talk here about dictatorship and
Hitlerism, but today you are proposing to reach out to millions of
people who have never been sought to be touched by the Federal
Government in the last 150 years and to gag them and handcuff
them in the exercise of their political rights.35
Some opposed the bill, calling it an effort to restrict Democratic Party
campaign efforts.36
Other critics of the Hatch Act charged that the Act unnecessarily
banned voluntary activity along with coercion, thereby infringing on
employees' rights to free expression. In response to such a critic during the
debate over the 1940 amendments, Senator Hatch explained, "I would draw
the line [between coercion and voluntary activity] if it could be drawn; but
I defy... [anyone] to draw that line. 37  President Roosevelt signed the
worthless items from those who contracted with the government).
34. Id. at 9598 (statement of Rep. Taylor).
35. Id. at 9599 (statement of Rep. Creal). Congressman Hook also invoked Hitler in
criticizing the "propaganda campaign" mounted in favor of the Act. Id. at 9609.
Congressman Hobbs said that federal employees "should not be compelled to surrender their
constitutional rights of liberty and free speech." Id. at 9602. Invocation of Hitler in
describing the partisan differences with one's political opponents has enjoyed uninterrupted
popularity since that time, resulting in what can be described as the reductio ad Hitlerum
argument. See, e.g., Liz Halloran, Furor over Fuhrer; Jews Condemn GOP's Hitler Ads,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 5, 2004, at DI (describing a Republican Party advertisement
juxtaposing various Democratic figures with footage of Hitler, which Republicans claimed
that they were merely using footage from an earlier ad comparing President Bush to Hitler
that had been submitted in a contest to a liberal organization, MoveOn.org, and briefly
posted on its website); Sheryl McCarthy, Put Bashing on Shelf, NEWSDAY, Aug. 2, 2004, at
A29 (relating Al Gore's accusation that the Bush administration employed "digital Brown
Shirts," referring to Hitler's thuggish uniformed allies, to intimidate media coverage of the
war in Iraq).
36. See, e.g., 84 CONG. REC. 9634 (1939) (statement of Rep. Sabath) (claiming that the
Act was "an ingenious piece of Republican political strategy" designed to "tie the hands of
[the Roosevelt] administration," and asking his "[f]ellow Democrats... are you blind to the
fact that you were sent here to represent your constituents and to support the
administration?"). Many supporters of the Act, though, including Senator Hatch, were
Democrats.
37. 86 CONG. REc. 2626 (1940) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Such concerns drove
opposition to Hatch Act liberalization in the late twentieth century. See, e.g., President's
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Hatch Act
Reform Amendments of 1990, vol. 1990, bk. I PUB. PAPERS 830, 831 (June 15, 1990)
THE HATCH ACT
Hatch Act into law on August 2, 1939.38
2. 1940 Amendments
The Hatch Act was amended in 1940, 39 with the "major purpose" 0 of
limiting the political activity of federally funded state and local government
employees, along with defining the ban on political activity and clarifying
that the Act applied to District of Columbia employees.
4'
State and local government employees receiving federal funding were
not covered in the original 1939 Act because the Act's writers wanted to
avoid infringing on state employment prerogatives.42 By the same token,
the Act's authors wanted to prevent federal money from funding coercive
activities at any level. 43 The Hatch Act's writers resolved the problem of
enforcement by providing for the withholding of federal funds if a state
opted not to remove an employee who violates the Act.44
Congress, in 1940, intended to establish a consistent definition of the
term "political activity" in the Hatch Act.45 The amendments entrusted
enforcement of state and local violations to the CSC to avoid varying
interpretation of provisions by various federal agencies administering
grants and loans.46 There was a great deal of debate over how to define the
term "political activity"-for example, whether it should be defined in the
Act or left to the CSC.4 7 The solution Congress arrived at was the adoption
of the rules as previously formulated by the CSC." This deprived the CSC
of "rulemaking power in the sense of exercising a subordinate legislative
role in fashioning a more expansive definition of the kind of conduct that
would violate the prohibition against taking an active part in political
("Overt coercion is difficult enough by itself to guard against and detect. The more subtle
forms of coercion are almost impossible to regulate, especially when they arise in a climate
in which the unspoken assumption is that political conformity is the route to achievement
and security.").
38. 84 CONG. REc. 10745-47 (1939).
39. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767 (amended 1940).
40. Rose, supra note 25, at 511.
41. 86 CONG. REC. 2338-41 (1940).
42. See id. at 2340-41 (statement by Sen. Hatch).
43. See id.
44. See Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 12(b), 54 Stat. 768 (amending the Hatch Act)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1506(a)(2)); see also discussion at 86 CONG. REC. 2340-
41 (1940) (explaining why states were not covered, and describing the act as "merely
exercising control over Federal funds" in a "reasonable and just" manner).
45. 86 CONG. REc. 2338-41 (1940).
46. Id. at 2341.
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See id. at 2938. The Supreme Court later held that Congress intended to adopt this
restatement offered by the CSC rather than all previous CSC decisions. See United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 572-75 (1973).
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management or political campaigns. 49
A clause in the original act providing that "[a]ll such persons shall
retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on
all political subjects" 50 was amended in 1940 to include the words "and
candidates."5 Congress also determined that employees should retain their
right to speak publicly and privately in all matters.52
For fifty years after 1940, Congress passed occasional minor
amendments to the Hatch Act. The Act was amended to allow the CSC by
unanimous vote to lessen the penalty for violating the Act to a ninety day
suspension, 3 and then it was further amended to a thirty day suspension.54
A series of attempts at broader change were vetoed.5 In 1974, the
restrictions applying to state and local employees were loosened, allowing
such employees to: (1) serve as officers of political parties; (2) solicit votes
and funds for partisan candidates; and (3) participate in and manage
political campaigns, while remaining subject to restrictions on the use of
"official authority or influence" to interfere with or affect an election or
nomination, and on candidacy in a partisan election.56
3. 1993 Amendments
In 1993, a bill liberalizing the Hatch Act's provisions for federal
employees' off-duty political activity was signed into law.57 As a result of
49. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 571-72. Congress' determination to entrust
enforcement to the CSC at the same time it withdrew rulemaking authority from the agency
led the Letter Carriers court to conclude that Congress "necessarily anticipated" "further
development of the law within the bounds of, and necessarily no more severe than, the 1940
rules ... ." Id. at 575.
50. Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147,
1148 § 9(a) (1939).
51. Amendment to Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 76-753,
54 Stat. 767, 767 § 2 (1940).
52. See 86 CONG. REc. 2623 (1940) (statement by Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch said that
"we expressly provided that all persons should have the right to express their opinions on all
political subjects, and the word 'privately,' which appears in the civil-service rule [Rule I],
was deliberately stricken out [so that] no curtailment or abridgment of the right of freedom
of speech" would result. Id.
53. See Act of Aug. 25, 1950, ch. 784, 64 Stat. 475 (1950) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7326).
54. See Act of Oct. 5, 1962, 76 Stat. 750 (1962).
55. President Ford and President George H. W. Bush had vetoed earlier attempts. See
President's Remarks Upon Vetoing the Hatch Act Amendments Bill, vol. 1976/1977, bk. H
PUB. PAPERS 1114-15 (Apr. 12, 1976); Message to the House of Representatives Returning
Without Approval the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1990, vol. 1990, bk. I PUB.
PAPERS 830-31 (June 15, 1990).
56. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1290 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503).
57. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001 (1993)
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the 1993 law's provisions, most federal employees are now permitted to
take an active part in political management and in political campaigns
when off duty, while some employees remain subject to the pre-1993
restrictions." The bill also strengthened other statutory provisions
punishing coercion of political activity of employees.59
The House passed the bill by a large margin, but there was strong
opposition in the Senate as the country debated Hatch Act reform.6 °
Proponents argued that the amendments would restore essential rights to
federal employees, the Act was confusing as applied, and the workforce
was more professional and merit-based than it had been when the Act was
originally passed.6' Opponents expressed fears that the proposed
liberalization, by punishing only difficult-to-detect coercion, would leave
workers susceptible to "subtle pressures to contribute money and time to
partisan causes., 62 They also argued that the government and the public
would be harmed,63 and that there was no demand among federal
employees for changes to the Act.64
The Senate passed a number of amendments more restrictive than the
House version of the bill, for example narrowing the permissible
solicitation of funds and leaving law enforcement employees further
restricted.65  After a senator threatened a filibuster, thwarting the
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326).
58. See discussion infra Part II.
59. See Hatch Act Reform Amendments § 4, (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603).
60. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S8954 (1993) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) (describing the
filibusters undertaken against the bill at different stages). Opponents entered numerous
newspaper editorials opposing liberalization of the Hatch Act into the record. 139 CONG.
REc. $8940 (1993).
61. See, e.g., id. at S8604 (statement of Sen. Glenn) (setting out the case for passing the
amendments).
62. Don't Destroy the Hatch Act, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1990, at A22, quoted in 139
CONG. REC. S8607 (1993).
63. See 139 CONG. REc. S8607 (1993) (statement of Sen. Roth) (noting that proponents
of Hatch Act reform "continue to ignore the adverse impact of this legislation on the
Government and on the American people and focus attention on the Federal employee....
The truth is.. . [tlhe Hatch Act protects Federal employees from the inside and outside
coercion.").
64. See 139 CONG. REc. H762 (1993) (statement by Rep. Wolf) (asking "[W]ho favors
this legislation-labor union bosses? I have not heard any clamor to be 'unhatched' from
my Federal [employee] constituents."). Senator Roth, citing editorials and public interest
groups opposed to changes, and surveys suggesting indifference or opposition among
federal employees to changing the Hatch Act, said, "[w]hile the Federal employee
organizations and the postal unions support change, in contrast to Federal employees as a
whole, the weight of other testimony given during hearings held by the committee in the
100th and 101st Congress, and this Congress, stands in opposition to this bill." Id. at S8608.
65. See id. at H6817 (providing a detailed discussion of the differences between the
initial House version and the Senate amendments adopted into law); see also H.R. 20, 103d
Cong. (1993) (the bill originally passed by the House); 139 CONG. REC. S8947 (1993)
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appointment of conferees,66 the House voted simply to adopt the Senate's
more restrictive version of the bill, forgoing a conference committee.67
Early versions of the 1993 amendments would have treated District of
Columbia employees in the same manner as state and local officials.6" A
Senate amendment, keeping District employees covered by the Hatch Act
rules that apply to federal employees, was adopted into the final law,69 In
the process, a previous provision that exempted District teachers was left
out, without explanation7° (and probably inadvertently 71 ). As a result, a
District teacher who refused to withdraw his candidacy or to resign from
his employment for partisan office despite two warnings from the OSC was
ordered removed by the Board in 2002.72
B. Agencies Responsible for Enforcement of the Hatch Act
The OSC, the successor to the CSC Office of General Counsel in
investigation of Hatch Act violations, was established as an arm of the
Board in the Civil Service Reform Act of 19787' and became an
independent agency in 1989. 74 The OSC is responsible for guarding the
merit system in federal employment and protecting whistleblowers from
reprisal. In addition, the OSC provides advisory opinions on the Hatch Act
in response to inquiries, 7 investigates allegations of violations,76 and
(Statement by Sen. Warner) (describing the Senate provisions).
66. See 139 CONG. REc. S8952, S8954-S8955 (1993); see also Avram Goldstein,
Teacher to Lose Job Under Hatch Act, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2002, at A8.
67. See 139 CONG. REC. H6814, H6827 (1993). Because there was no committee
report, floor debates are the only source of insight on congressional intent.
68. See H.R. REP No. 103-16, at 16 (1993); see also H.R. 20, 103d Cong. (1993). Most
laws have granted such treatment to District employees since the passage of the Home Rule
statute. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
69. 139 CONG. REc. S8676 (1993).
70. Id. at S8671-S8676; see also Briggs v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d
1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The rationale for [the 1993 removal of the exception for
District of Columbia teachers] ... is unexplained in the legislative history.").
71. See Goldstein, supra note 66, at A8 (stating that an unnamed former Senate
employee expressed regret at the omission).
72. Special Counsel v. Briggs, 91 M.S.P.B. 669 (2002), aff'd sub nom Briggs v. United
States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
73. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
74. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
OSC's responsibilities and powers are set out at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1222 (1996).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 1212(f) (2000). These advisory opinions are not binding on the Board.
The D.C. circuit has written that the advisory opinions "offer essentially a forecast, albeit an
educated one, of the way the MSPB would rule if an actual case materialized." Am. Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 909 (1985).
76. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1212 (a)(5), 1216(a)(1), 1216(a)(2), 1504 (2000).
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presents complaints of violations of the Hatch Act to the Board. 77 The
OSC also issues regulations on filing complaints, allegations, and
procedures .78
The Board consists of three members appointed by the president.
79
The Board hears complaints submitted by the OSC.80  The Board also
determines penalties for violations of the Act."1 Employees accused of
violations are guaranteed due process, including a hearing. 2 The Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) is charged with issuing implementing
regulations for the Hatch Act.83
The OSC serves an educational function, promoting knowledge of the
Hatch Act's provisions through outreach programs throughout the country.
For the Hatch Act to effectively deter misuse of authority and increase
reports of violations, and with them prosecutions, government employees
must be aware of the Hatch Act's provisions. OSC outreach programs can
help ameliorate any misunderstanding of the Act.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE HATCH ACT
This section will examine the specific political activities permitted and
prohibited under the Hatch Act. The rules emerge from the Act, as
interpreted in regulations issued by the OPM, court and Board decisions,
and OSC advisory opinions. The Act contains separate provisions for
federal employees and state and local employees employed in connection
with federal funding. The Act applies a heightened level of restrictions to
some federal "further restricted employees."
OPM regulations and OSC interpretations of the statute and these
77. 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(1)(B)(1996).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 1212(e) (2000) ("The Special Counsel may prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to perform the functions of the Special Counsel. Such
regulations shall be published in the Federal Register.").
79. 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1211 (providing a delineation of
Board functions and procedures).
80. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214, 1504, 7326 (2000).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1505 (20000). The Hatch Act
provision on state and local employees does not specifically refer to any penalties other than
suspension.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(2) (2000).
83. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7325, 1103(b)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the division of labor
among the agencies, focusing on the issue of regulations, see Memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to James A. Kahl, Deputy Special Counsel, Office of
Special Counsel (Feb. 2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/hatch.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2005) (concluding that "[t]he Office of Personnel Management, rather than
the Office of Special Counsel, has the authority to promulgate regulations delimiting the
scope and nature of permissible activities under the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of
1993.").
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regulations detail the precise kinds of political activity prohibited under the
Hatch Act. Following the 2004 campaign season, the OSC and the OPM
may consider revising the regulations for the sake of clarity and in order to
bring them up to date with current technology such as e-mail. The OSC
must continue to engage in outreach programs to promote understanding of
the Hatch Act. Employees who do not fully understand the Act's
provisions can also obtain an advisory opinion from the OSC. Surveys
taken before the 1993 amendments indicated that roughly thirty percent of
federal employees would engage in partisan political activity if they were
permitted, but only eleven percent actually participated in the wake of the
changes to the law.84  This lower-than-anticipated reported rate of
participation may be due in part to incomplete understanding of the rules
under the Hatch Act. The OSC's advisory letters on the use of e-mail while
on duty, discussed below,8" have established an effective standard for
preventing misuse. Continuing consultation between the OSC and the
OPM to reflect changed technology will help keep the Act's application
clear.
A. Federal Employees and District of Columbia Employees
1. Who Is Covered
All federal executive branch and civil service employees except the
president and vice president are subject to the Hatch Act.86 Employees on
leave are subject to Hatch Act restrictions.87 Hatch Act restrictions on
federal workers apply to all District of Columbia employees except the
mayor, recorder of deeds, and members of the city council.88 Those serving
in the military are not covered by the Act.89 While most of those covered
84. Most Feds Not Active in Politics, ISSUES OF MERIT (U.S. Merit Sys. Pro. Bd.) Sept.
2000 at 3, available at http://www.mspb.gov/studies/newsletters/00septnws.pdf.
85. See discussion infra Part II.A.8.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(1) (2000). The statute also specifies that employees of the General
Accounting Office (now called the Government Accountability Office), an agency that
reports to Congress rather than the executive, are not covered.
87. See Alexander v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474, 482 (6th Cir.
1999).
Congress specifically considered and rejected a provision which would have
exempted from the Hatch Act's prohibitions those candidates who had taken a
leave of absence without pay. The legislative history of the Act further
discloses that the intent of the statute was to prohibit partisan candidacy by any
covered employee who had not resigned from his or her employment.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(1)(C); see discussion supra Part I.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(1). The political activities of those serving in the military are
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are considered "less restricted employees," some "further restricted
employees" are subject to additional provisions.
90
2. Permitted Activity of Less Restricted Employees
While the Hatch Act provides for restrictions on the political activity
of government employees, the Act and the regulations issued under it stress
that employees retain the ability to engage in a degree of political
participation.9' Political activity is defined as "an activity directed toward
the success or failure of a political party, candidate for partisan political
office, or partisan political group. 92  Some core political activities are
permitted to all employees covered by the Hatch Act. For example, "[a]n
employee retains the right to vote as he chooses and to express his opinion
on political subjects and candidates." 93 Employees can also engage in a
range of political activities while off duty under the Hatch Act. Individual
activities such as donating money to a partisan group or candidate94 and
attending fundraisers95 are permitted.
Due to the changes made by the 1993 amendments to the Act, less
restricted employees can "[t]ake an active part in managing the political
campaign of a partisan political candidate or a candidate for political party
office," '96 including "supervising paid and unpaid campaign workers." 97
They can canvass for votes, endorse candidates, and circulate petitions.98
Serving as party officers and as delegates to conventions and participating
in political rallies is also permitted. 99
Nonpartisan political activity is permitted for all Hatch Act-covered
employees. They can "[b]e politically active in connection with a question
which is not specifically identified with a political party, such as a
constitutional amendment [or] referendum,"' 00 and participate, hold office,
and fundraise on behalf of a nonpartisan group as long as the purpose is not
for promoting or opposing a political party or candidate in a partisan
restricted by a variety of other provisions. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) (2000) (prohibiting
military officers from campaigning for or holding civil office), 18 U.S.C. § 593 (2000)
(prohibiting interference with elections by the military).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2000).
91. See 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (2000), 5 U.S.C. § 7323(c), 5 C.F.R. § 734.202 (2004).
92. 5 C.F.R. § 734.101.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(c) (2000).
94. 5 C.F.R. § 734.208(a) (2004).
95. 5 C.F.R. § 734.208(b)(1) (2004).
96. 5 C.F.R. § 734.205(f) (2004).
97. 5 C.F.R. § 734.205 ex. 7 (2004).
98. 5 C.F.R. § 734.205 (2004).
99. 5 C.F.R. § 734.204 (2004).
100. 5 C.F.R. § 734.203(b) (2004) (for less restricted employees), § 734.403(d) (2004)
(for further restricted employees).
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election.'' Employees can also be candidates in nonpartisan elections.'0 2
3. Prohibited Activity
The Hatch Act enumerates a number of political activities prohibited
to all that it covers, whether less restricted or further restricted employees.
Employees may not run for office in a partisan election, solicit political
contributions, solicit or encourage political activity of those with business
before the employee's agency, or use their official authority to affect the
outcome of an election.' 3 Employees are prohibited from being candidates
in a partisan election, using official authority to interferewith an election,
fundraising for political purposes, and engaging in political activity while
on duty-including use of e-mail and partisan voter registration drives.
4. Candidacy in a Partisan Election
Federal employees subject to Hatch Act limitations may not run for
office in a partisan election.' °4 If any candidate on the ballot chooses to run
for election as a representative of, for instance, the Democratic or
Republican Party, the election is considered to be partisan for purposes of
the Hatch Act.' 5 State and local laws designating an election or office as
nonpartisan create a presumption that the election is not covered by the
Hatch Act, but "this presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing
that partisan politics actually enter the campaigns of the candidates."'
1 6
101. 5 C.F.R. § 734.203 (2004) (for less restricted employees), § 734.404(a)(1) (2004)
(for further restricted employees).
102. 5 C.F.R. § 734.207(b) (2004) (for less restricted employees), § 734.403(b) (2004)
(for further restricted employees).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a) (2000).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(2) (2000) ("'partisan political office' means any office for which
any candidate is nominated or elected as representing a party any of whose candidates for
Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at which Presidential
electors were selected .. "); see also Special Counsel v. Mahnke, 54 M.S.P.B. 13, 16
(1992) (holding that party affiliation appearing next to the name of any candidate rendered
the election partisan).
106. In re Broering, 1 P.A.R. 778, 779 (1955); see also Special Counsel v. Yoho, 15
M.S.P.B. 409 (1983) (reaffirming the rule), overruled on other grounds, Special Counsel v.
Pumell, 37 M.S.P.B. 184, 200-02 (1988), affid sub nom. Fela v. United States Merit Sys.
Prot. Bd., 730 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1989). A later case rejected any reliance on state
law in the context of determining whether an individual permitted to run in a partisan race as
an independent under 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (2000) was actually running as a partisan candidate.
Campbell v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 27 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The
court expressed the view that "looking to state law would be unwise" in determining the
definition of "independent candidate" due to the risk of "disuniformity," holding instead that
the decision turned on "whether a reasonable mind could conclude that one or more of the
240
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If partisanship is injected into a race, as through solicitations,
statements, or advertisements, that race is then considered partisan. For
example, Erhard Mahnke, a city employee subject to the Hatch Act, ran as
an independent against an opponent who campaigned as a representative of
a party, including his party affiliation on the ballot.0 7 Relying on Special
Counsel v. Yoho and In re Broering, the Board granted a petition for
removal.'0 8  In 2003, the Board found that a race that was initially
nonpartisan became partisan through the content of solicitations for
donations and public statements of the candidates.'0 9  The charged
employee in Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection Board1  sought and
received a party endorsement, advertised the endorsement, and used party-
owned materials in his candidacy."' His Board-ordered suspension was
upheld by the Federal Circuit.!
12
Hatch Act prohibitions apply to "any act in furtherance of
candidacy,""' 3 including acts before a formal announcement. Canvassing
for votes, circulating petitions for candidacy, and soliciting funding are
prohibited under the Act.'
The Hatch Act permits the OPM to designate localities within which
federal employees subject to the Act can run for office as independent
candidates for election to partisan political offices. "' The OPM has
designated a variety of locations within Virginia and Maryland, along with
twelve other areas."16
5. Use of Official Authority to Influence or Interfere with an Election
Hatch Act-covered employees are not permitted to "use [their] official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the
relevant definitions of ['independent'] does not fairly describe [the accused employee]." Id.
107. Mahnke, 54 M.S.P.B. at 13.
108. Id. at 16.
109. M.S.P.B. v. McEntee, Docket No. CB-1216-02-0007-T-1 (2002) (initial decision),
aff'd sub. nom Special Counsel v. McEntee, 94 M.S.P.R. 486 (2003).
110. Campbell was permitted to run as an independent in a partisan election under laws
currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7325 and 5 C.F.R. § 733.107 (2004). Campbell, 27 F.3d at
1561.
111. Campbell, 27 F.3d at 1563.
112. Id. at 1562.
113. In re Lukasik, 3 P.A.R. 34, 35 (1969) (citation omitted).
114. Id. See also In re Rooks, 3 P.A.R. 17, 24 (1969).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (2000); see also 5 C.F.R. § 733.107 (2004); 5 C.F.R. §
733.103(b)(1) (2004). A candidate who is permitted to run as an independent may not run
as a de facto partisan representative, for example by seeking and advertising a party
endorsement or making use of party resources. See Campbell, 27 F.3d at 1569-70.
116. 5 C.F.R. § 733.107.
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result of an election."'" 7 Under this provision, employees are barred from
promoting the candidacy of a partisan candidate by using an official job
title in connection with a campaign, "coerc[ing] any person to participate in
political activity," or "soliciting, accepting, or receiving uncompensated
individual volunteer services from a subordinate for any political
purpose."' 18
Soliciting political services of a subordinate violates the Hatch Act
because employees are presumed to believe their status with their employer
might be affected by their decision to make or refuse to make a political
contribution.'1 9 The Act bars requests because an employee "might feel it
would be indiscreet not to comply."' 2 °
It must be remembered, however, that the government is permitted to
defend its policies. The president, and through him the cabinet officers,
enjoy wide latitude to require career subordinates to provide support for a
defense of administration policies when it can be reasonably related to
official duty. There is considerable "play in the joints" in this arena,
leaving room for a rule of reason and common sense in determining when
bright lines have been crossed.
6. Fundraising
Employees subject to the Hatch Act may not "solicit, accept or receive
a political contribution from another person,''. with one narrow
exception.122 The ban on fundraising prohibits personal solicitations, 23 and
prohibits permitting an "official title to be used in connection with
fundraising activities,"'24 including on a group's stationery. Employees
may not "solicit, accept, or receive uncompensated volunteer services''
25
from a subordinate, even if offered voluntarily. Some participation in
fundraisers, such as giving speeches and donating materials to be auctioned
for a campaign, is permitted, although use of official title is not.'26 A
covered employee can even organize or manage fundraising activities as
117. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2000).
118. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302 (2004).
119. In re Fleming, 2 P.A.R. 1, 2 (1943).
120. In re Gunn, 2 P.A.R. 611,614 (1959).
121. 5 C.F.R. 734.303(a) (2004).
122. Members of federal labor organizations can solicit, accept, and receive political
contributions and services from a person who is not a subordinate for a "multicandidate
political committee" as long as solicitation does not take place on duty or in a federal
building, and is not directed at a subordinate. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2)(A) (2000).
123. 5 C.F.R. § 734.303(a).
124. 5 C.F.R. § 734.303(c).
125. 5 C.F.R. § 734.303(d).
126. 5 C.F.R. § 734.208 exs. 2, 8 (2004). Direct solicitation of funds is prohibited.
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long as he or she does not "personally solicit, accept, or receive political
donations," which includes hosting or inviting people to a fundraiser. 127
There are criminal prohibitions on fundraising activities while on duty or
from other federal employees.
28
7. Activities While on Duty, in a Federal Building, Wearing a Federal
Uniform or Insignia, or in a Federal Vehicle
The 1993 amendments to the Hatch Act, permitting greater off-duty
political involvement for covered federal employees, prohibited engaging
in political activity while on duty. 129 The "political activity" prohibited
while on duty includes activities undertaken by employees individually,
regardless of any connection to partisan candidates or groups. 3 0
In Burrus v. Vegliante, the Second Circuit rejected a district court
holding that covered government employees could post signs advocating
the election of partisan candidates in non-public areas of a workplace, as
long as the activity was not "coordinated with or in concert with a political
party or candidate."'' The Second Circuit, in concluding otherwise, drew
a distinction between the "political activity" prohibited while on duty under
Section 7324 and "'tak[ing] an active part in political management or in
political campaigns,"' permitted under Section 7323(a). 32  Looking to
statutory language, current regulations, legislative history indicating
congressional intent to "tighten up" the Hatch Act while on duty, and pre-
1993 regulations defining the terms "political activity" and "political
management or... political campaigns," the court found that the two terms
each had a separate and distinct meaning. 33 The Hatch Act was held not to
permit covered employees to display in an interior area of a post office a
poster depicting one partisan candidate for president as more desirable than
an opponent.1
3 4
This ban extends to activity in federal buildings, 135 while wearing a
127. 5 C.F.R. § 734.208 ex. 7 (2004).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (2000) (making it a felony for a federal officer or
employee "to knowingly solicit any contribution" from any other federal officer or
employee); see also 18 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1) (2000) (making it a felony "for any person to
solicit.., a donation of money... in any room or building occupied in the discharge of
official duties by any officer or employee of the United States.").
129. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1) (2000).
130. Burrus v. Vegliante, 336 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 85 (quoting Burrus v. Vegliante, 247 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
132. Burrus, 336 F.3d at 88 (quoting the former statutory language of 5 U.S.C. §
7324(a)(2)(1993)).
133. Id. at 88-90.
134. Id. at 90.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2000).
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uniform or official insignia,"' or while using a federal vehicle. 137 Wearing
a partisan pin, 3s displaying partisan pictures, bumper stickers, 39 or
posters,140 and attending partisan political functions14 ' are all barred while
on duty. A President-appointed, Senate-confirmed employee may hold
political events in his office, but the events may not be paid for with
appropriated funds.
42
The prohibition on partisan political activity by employees received
some attention during the 2004 election campaign. 14' The OSC issued an
advisory opinion to clarify that federal employees may not authorize the
use of federal buildings for campaign activities, and may not attend such
activities while in a federal building or office.' 44 The Hatch Act only
applies to activities in a "room or building," and not to outdoor locations
such as national parks. 45 The statute provides no grounds for dividing a
federal building into rooms that are and are not covered by the Hatch Act;
instead, all rooms in a federal building are covered.' 46
8. Use of E-mail
The use of e-mail to campaign in support of or in opposition to a
partisan candidate or group can blur the line between protected expression
of an individual's opinion 147 and prohibited on-duty political activity.
141
OSC letters and opinions have interpreted the Hatch Act and its regulations
136. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(3).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(4).
138. 5 C.F.R. § 734.306 ex. 16 (2004). While wearing partisan pins is forbidden by the
Hatch Act, wearing a pin while on duty expressing a view on a nonpartisan issue is
permitted. See Letter from Amber A. Bell, Attorney, Hatch Act Unit, U.S. Office of Special
Counsel (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federal/fha-
30.htm.
139. 5 C.F.R. § 734.306 exs. 2-6 (2004).
140. Burrus v. Vegliante, 336 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
7324(a)(2)).
141. 5 C.F.R. § 734.306 ex. 11 (2000).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(b). The employee's position must be in the United States and
involve policymaking.
143. OSC has investigated whether employees involved in a "town hall meeting" held by
Senator John Kerry and other Democratic politicians in a federal facility may have violated
the Hatch Act. See John McCaslin, NASA See-Saw, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 2004; Stephen
Barr, Kerry Visit Could Put NASA in the Hot Seat, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at C02.
144. Letter by Ana Galindo-Marrone, Chief, Hatch Act Unit, U.S. Office of Special
Counsel (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federal/fha-
35.htm.
145. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2).
146. See Letter by Ana Galindo-Marrone, supra note 144.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (2000).
148. See 5 U.S.C. §7324(a).
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as applied to the use of e-mail.1 49 The content and audience of an e-mail
message determine its permissibility. Factors in an analysis of the legality
of an e-mail under the Hatch Act include whether an e-mail is sent while on
duty or from government computers, whether the content of the e-mail
amounts to partisan campaigning, and whether the audience of the e-mail
indicates a private discussion or a general announcement. 50 The OSC has
stressed the case-by-case nature of an inquiry into a complaint of a Hatch
Act violation by use of e-mail."'
E-mail directed at the success or failure of a partisan candidate or
party is permitted in the same manner that "water cooler" discussions are
permitted under the Act. 512 For example, an on-duty employee is permitted
to e-mail "a few co-workers with whom the employee regularly engaged in
friendly political debate... [along with] the text of a newspaper column
critical of one of the Presidential candidates' tax proposals, with a
statement supportive of the columnist's views."' 53 This kind of activity,
akin to a private discussion, is not considered prohibited by the Hatch Act.
On the other hand, an employee who sent a mass e-mail while on duty
to a large number of co-workers clearly advocating for the success of a
presidential candidate was found to have violated the Hatch Act. 1
54
The OSC and the OPM may need to revisit the Hatch Act's
regulations following the 2004 election season. The current regulations do
not address issues such as the use of e-mail and telecommuting. Use of a
government-owned laptop computer while at home to send mass e-mails to
149. The Hatch Act regulations were last updated before e-mail was in common use.
The Act specifically prohibits use of government vehicles, rooms, and buildings for political
activity, but does not mention computers. Most alleged Hatch Act violations for e-mail use,
however, take place in a government room or building.
150. Letter by William E. Reukauf, Associate Special Counsel for Investigation and
Prosecution, U.S. Office of Special Counsel (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter E-mail Advisory
Opinion], available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federal/fha-29.htm.
To determine whether a communication by E-mail falls under the Hatch Act's
prohibition against on-duty political activity, relevant considerations include,
but are not limited to: (1) the content of the message (i.e., is its purpose to
encourage the recipient to support a particular political party or vote for a
particular candidate for partisan political office); (2) its audience (e.g., the
number of people it was sent to, the sender's relationship to the recipients); and
(3) whether the message was sent in a federal building, in a government-owned
vehicle, or when the employee was on duty.
Id.
151. Id.
152. See 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (2000), 5 C.F.R. § 734.101; see also E-mail Advisory Opinion,
supra note 150.
153. E-mail Advisory Opinion, supra note 150.
154. Id. The e-mail stressed that time was running out to "bring Nader voters to their
senses and get them to vote for the ONLY candidate for President-Al Gore!! !" Id.
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co-workers directed at the success or failure of a partisan candidate or
group would seem to violate the spirit of the Act. It is not readily apparent,
however, that the statute reaches this act, if the act is done while off duty.
One possible solution would be to consider use of a government computer
in political activity to be "on duty" for purposes of the Hatch Act. Some
response, in the regulations or in the statute itself, may be necessary to
avoid loopholes for partisan activity in the government workplace.
9. Voter Registration Drives
Voter registration activities in the workplace are permitted, but only as
long as they are not directed toward the success or failure of a candidate or
political party. 5 5 Recently, a federal employee union that had been deeply
involved with partisan politics sought to conduct voter registration drives in
the workplace.1 16 The union at issue had endorsed partisan candidates in
the past, had become identified with the success or failure of a presidential
candidate, and had expressly indicated elsewhere that its voter registration
activities were intended to further its political goals. 5 7 The OSC advised
that the union's voter registration activities in the workplace would cause
involved federal employees to violate the Hatch Act.
58
10. Further Restricted Employees
When the Hatch Act was liberalized in 1993, Congress opted to keep
155. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 589 F. Supp. 1551 (D.D.C. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Letter from K. William
O'Connor, Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, (Apr. 6, 1984) (on file with
U.S. Office of Special Counsel); Letter from Scott J. Bloch, Special Counsel, Office of
Special Counsel, (Apr. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Voter Registration Drive Advisory I],
available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federal/fha-3 1.htm ("In determining
whether a voter registration drive is partisan, OSC considers all of the circumstances
surrounding the drive. Some of the factors relevant to this inquiry, as discussed in our 1984
opinion, include: 1) the political activities of the sponsoring organization; 2) the degree to
which that organization has become identified with the success or failure of a partisan
political candidate, issue or party (e.g., whether it has endorsed a candidate); 3) the nexus, if
any, between the decision to undertake a voter registration drive and the other political
objectives of the sponsor; 4) whether particular groups are targeted for registration on the
basis of their perceived political preference; and 5) the nature of publicity circulated to
targets of the drive immediately prior to or during the drive.").
156. See Voter Registration Drive Advisory I, supra, note 155; see also Letter from
William E. Reukauf, Associate Special Counsel for Investigation and Prosecution, Office of
Special Counsel (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter Voter Registration Drive Advisory II],
available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federallfha-32.htm.
157. See id.
158. Id. Participation in a registration drive is prohibited only in the workplace. Prior to
the 1993 amendments, such activity was prohibited at all times.
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heightened restrictions in place for employees of a number of agencies.
59
All activities denied to less restricted employees are also denied to further
restricted employees. Some of these agencies have changed their names or
have realigned since the 1993 amendments; the status of these agencies'
employees under the Hatch Act is unclear.' 6 The agencies subject to
heightened restrictions are generally responsible for law enforcement or
national security issues. Some agencies that Congress did not subject to
heightened restrictions can opt to abide by similar restrictions. 6'
These employees retain the right to engage in many political
activities.16  They are permitted to vote and to work in nonpartisan
capacities and campaigns,163 to attend political rallies and meetings,' 64 to
donate money to partisan groups and candidates, 165 and to sign nominating
petitions. 66  They also are able to voice their opinions as individuals
"privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates" unless their
actions are coordinated with a partisan group. 16 7  Participation in
159. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2)(B) (2000) lists the agencies whose employees are subject to
the additional restrictions: the Federal Election Commission or the Election Assistance
Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Office of Special
Counsel, the Office of Criminal Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of
Investigative Programs of the United States Customs Service, the Office of Law
Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, in addition to career appointees, administrative law judges, contract
appeals board members, and administrative appeals judges; except those nominated by the
president and confirmed by the Senate.
160. For example, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency is now called the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Office of Investigative Programs of the United States
Customs Service has been reconstituted as the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The department formerly
known as the Office of Law Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
has been absorbed into the DHS and the Department of Justice.
161. See Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,121 (Oct. 27, 1994)
(authorizing the Secretary to limit the political activities of political appointees of the
Department of State); Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,515
(Nov. 1, 1994) (authorizing the Secretary to limit the political activities of political
appointees of the Department of Defense); Memorandum for the Attorney General, 59 Fed.
Reg. 50,809 (Oct. 5, 1994), (authorizing the Attorney General to limit the political activities
of political appointees of the Department of Justice).
162. See generally 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.402-.405 (2004) for permitted activities of further
restricted employees.
163. 5 C.F.R. § 734.403.
164. 5 C.F.R. § 734.404(a)(3).
165. 5 C.F.R. § 734.404(a)(4).
166. 5 C.F.R. § 734.402(c). Further restricted employees can sign nominating petitions,
but they may not circulate them. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411 (e) (2004).
167. 5 C.F.R. § 734.402.
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nonpartisan voter registration drives is also permitted.
168
Unlike less restricted employees, however, further restricted
employees may not "take an active part in political management or political
campaigns. ,1 69 These employees may not manage campaigns for partisan
office,170 endorse or oppose a candidate in political literature in concert
with a partisan group or person,' 71 or canvass for votes in concert with a
partisan groups or person.172  Their activities within political groups are
also limited. Serving as an officer of a political party or partisan group,
73
as a "delegate, alternate, or proxy" to a party convention, 74 and making
speeches in support of or opposition to a candidate in concert with a
partisan group'75 is prohibited.
Further restricted employees are barred from fundraising for a political
purpose. They may not "solicit, accept, or receive political contributions,"
nor sell tickets for partisan events or actively participate in fundraising
activities. 176
11. Expression of Views
A further restricted employee may "[e]xpress his or her opinion
privately and publicly on political subjects.' 77  As discussed above, the
prohibition on "political activity" in Section 7324 reaches individual acts,
while the ban on "tak[ing] an active part in political management or in
political campaigns" for further restricted employees under Section
7323(b)(2)(A) reaches only acts on behalf of or in connection with a
political party, partisan groups, or candidates.
Two 1988 circuit court cases help clarify the meaning of this
prohibition and of other political activities prohibited to further restricted
employees. 78 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed United Public Workers v.
168. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 589 F. Supp. 1551 (D.D.C. 1984),
vacated by 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also In re Crawford, I PAR 262 (1946).
These cases indicate that a group may not merely declare its voter registration effort to be
nonpartisan to comply with the Hatch Act. See discussion supra Part II.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2)(A) (2000).
170. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411(a) (2004).
171. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411(d).
172. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411(c).
173. 5 C.F.R. § 734.409(a) (2004).
174. 5 C.F.R. § 734.409(d).
175. 5 C.F.R. § 734.409(d).
176. 5 C.F.R. § 734.410 (2004).
177. 5 C.F.R. § 734.203(a) (2004).
178. See Blaylock v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 851 F.2d 1348 (11 th Cir. 1988);
Biller v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 863 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1988). The violations in
these cases took place before the 1993 amendments. The employees charged in these cases
would today be classified as less restricted employees and would not be subject to the
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Mitchell, United States Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers and the
Hatch Act's legislative history to find that "the Hatch Act is violated only
by actions taken in concerted effort with partisan activity or formal,
organized, political groups. 179  Blaylock, a civilian employee of the
Department of the Air Force who had been on unpaid leave for ten years,
wrote a series of election-year articles critical of President Reagan and
favorable to Democratic challenger Walter Mondale in a magazine for
federal employees) 8 The OSC filed a complaint, and the Board upheld an
administrative law judge's finding that the employee had violated the
Hatch Act prohibition on taking an active part in political management or
in political campaigns.' 8' The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court
rejected the government's argument that the statute's restriction on
"political campaigns" reached repeated activities such as writing a series of
articles. 182 The court drew support from the regulations, which forbade
only partisan activities, 8 and the 1940 amendments, which were intended
to cut off the CSC's ability to broaden the list of prohibited activities. 8 4 "It
is far more probable," the court concluded "that Congress intended the
statutory term 'political campaigns' to refer to the formal efforts of
organized political parties to secure the election of their candidates.' 85
The Second Circuit also held that "[i]t is not enough that the federal
employee and the candidate pursue the same political goals independently;
the two must work in tandem or be linked together for there to be a
Section 7323(b)(2)(A) prohibition on taking "an active part in political management or in
political campaigns." The rule advanced in these cases still applies today to further
restricted employees.
179. Blaylock, 851 F.2d at 1356.
180. Id. at 1349-50.
181. Id. at 1351.
182. Id. at 1355-56. "[T]he government apparently believes that eight expressions of an
individual's political opinion constitute a campaign; the magic number, however, might well
be two, or five hundred." Id.
183. Id. at 1356.
5 C.F.R. § 733.122(10) prohibits 'endorsing or opposing a candidate for public
office in a partisan election or a candidate for political party office in a political
advertisement, a broadcast, campaign, literature, or similar material.' The
placement of the comma between the words 'campaign' and 'literature' is
undoubtedly a typographical error. The regulation appears without the comma
in both the Federal Register and the Letter Carriers opinion where the Supreme
Court passed on the constitutionality of the implementing regulations. With the
comma, the regulation either makes little sense or seems dangerously broad.
(citations omitted). This regulation now appears at 5 C.F.R. § 734.411 (d) (2004) without a
comma between "campaign" and "literature."
184. Blaylock, 851 F.2d at 1351-52.
185. Id. at 1355.
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violation of the Hatch Act." 186  The court found that the Hatch Act's
legislative history "mandate[d] a construction of the Act in favor of First
Amendment rights." 187 A Postal Service employee who had been on leave
without pay for more than twenty years had endorsed a presidential
candidate. 188  The Second Circuit reversed the Board's finding of a
violation. 8 9
12. Penalties
Federal employees who violate the Hatch Act are subject to removal
from their positions. 19° If the Board unanimously concludes that the
offense warrants a lesser penalty, the employee can be suspended without
pay for no less than thirty days. 191
Mitigating and aggravating factors considered by the Board in
determining a penalty include: (1) the nature of the offense and the extent
of the employee's participation; (2) the employee's motive and intent; (3)
whether the employee received the advice of counsel regarding the
activities at issue; (4) whether the employee ceased the activities; (5) the
employee's past employment record; and (6) the political coloring of the
employee's activities.192
In a recent case, the Board found that because the race was initially
nonpartisan and because the respondent took steps to reduce its
partisanship upon receiving warning from the OSC, a 120-day suspension
was warranted rather than removal.
193
B. State and Local Employees
The Hatch Act imposes some restrictions on state and local employees
who are employed in connection with federal funds. These provisions are
not as restrictive as those that apply to federal employees. There are three
186. Biller v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 863 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1988).
The court looked to legislative history, case law, and the Act's purpose, which was
preventing machine politics. Id. at 1089.
187. Id. at 1086.
188. Id. at 1081.
189. Id. at 1090.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (2000).
191. Id.
192. See Special Counsel v. Pumell, 37 M.S.P.B. 184, 200 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Fela v.
United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 730 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1989); see also Alexander
v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474, 483 (6th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
55 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir. 1995); Special Counsel v. Lee, 58 M.S.P.B. 81, 91 (1993)
(explaining and apply both the aggravating and mitigating factors).
193. M.S.P.B. v. McEntee, Docket No. CB-1216-02-0007-T-1 (2002) (initial decision),
aff'd sub. nom Special Counsel v. McEntee, 94 M.S.P.R. 486 (2003).
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activities prohibited to covered state and local employees. They may not
run for partisan office, coerce donations from other covered employees, or
use their official authority to influence the results of an election.
1. Which State and Local Employees Are Covered
The Hatch Act applies to executive branch state and local employees
who, as a normal and foreseeable incident of their principal positions or
jobs, perform duties in connection with an activity financed in whole or in
part by federal loans or grants.' 94 The Act does not require that an
employee have discretionary authority over federal funds in order to be
covered.
95
State and local-administered programs that commonly receive grants
and loans from the federal government, subjecting employees to Hatch Act
provisions, include education, training and employment, social services,
health, transportation, environmental protection, community and regional
development, housing, emergency preparedness, homeland security,
196agriculture, and law enforcement programs.
Employees of private nonprofit organizations can be covered by the
Hatch Act if the federal statute through which the organization receives
funds directs that the organization shall be considered to be a state or local
agency for purposes of the Hatch Act. The Head Start' 97 and Community
Service Block Grant 98 statutes include such a provision.
When an employee holds two or more jobs, principal employment is
determined by reference to salary received and hours worked at various
jobs.' 99 Employees remain covered by Hatch Act restrictions when on
annual leave, sick leave, leave without pay, administrative leave, or
furlough.200 "Principal employment" relates to an employee's primary
position-for example, whether for Hatch Act purposes he is considered a
sheriff or an insurance salesman-and not to primary duties within public
194. 5 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000); see also Special Counsel v. Gallagher, 44 M.S.P.B. 57
(1990); In re Hutchins, 2 P.A.R. 160, 164 (1944).
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 1501; see also Williams, 55 F.3d at 920-21; Gallagher, 44 M.S.P.B.
at 57.
196. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND THE BUDGET, FY 2005, 113-30.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 9851(a) (2000).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 9918(b)(1) (2000).
199. See, e.g., Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D.
Wis. 1968); Matturi v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 130 F. Supp. 15, 16-17 (D.N.J.
1955), affid, 229 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1956); Anderson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
119 F. Supp. 567, 576-77 (D. Mont. 1954).
200. See Alexander v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474, 482 (6th Cir.
1999); Minn. Dep't of Jobs & Training v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 875 F.2d 179,
183 (8th Cir. 1989).
2005]
252 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:2
employment. 20'
Some state and local employees are specifically exempted from
particular provisions of the Hatch Act. Employees who work for
educational or research institutions such as state universities are not
covered by the Act at all.202  Publicly elected officials, including city
mayors, governors, lieutenant governors, and heads of municipal and state
executive departments, are permitted to run for office.0 3 Such elected
officials remain bound by the other Hatch Act prohibitions on interfering
with elections and soliciting other covered employees for political
donations .204
2. Provisions of the Hatch Act Applying to State and Local Employees
The Hatch Act and its regulations list a number of permitted and
prohibited political activities for covered state and local employees.
Employees may not run for office in a partisan election, coerce donations
from other covered employees, or use official authority to influence the
outcome of an election.205 The bulk of Hatch Act offenses at the state and
local level involve candidacy in a partisan election.20 6
Each state and local employee "retains the right to vote as he chooses
and to express his opinions on political subjects and candidates."2 7
Covered state and local employees are also permitted to engage in
nonpartisan political activity, including candidacy.2 8
Covered state and local employees may not be candidates for public
office in a partisan election.2 °9 If any candidate on the ballot represents a
political party, '0 regardless of state or local law, 21 the Hatch Act forbids
candidacy by covered state and local employees. The Hatch Act
prohibition on candidacy applies to any act in furtherance of candidacy
prior to formal announcement, such as soliciting funds.2 12
201. See Matturi, 130 F. Supp. at 16-17; Anderson, 119 F. Supp. at 576-77; see also
Special Counsel v. Carter, 45 M.S.P.B. 447 (1990).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4)(B) (2000).
203. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(c) (2000).
204. Id.
205. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a).
206. See chart infra Part VI.
207. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(b).
208. 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3).
210. 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (Candidacy is permitted "if none of the candidates is to be
nominated or elected at such election as representing a party ...."); see also Special
Counsel v. Mahnke, 54 M.S.P.B. 13, 16 (1992).
211. See In re Broering, I P.A.R. 778, 778-79 (1955). See also Special Counsel v.
Yoho, 15 M.S.P.B. 409, 411 (1983).
212. See In re Lukasik, 3 P.A.R. 34, 35 (1969).
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The use of an official position to benefit or to oppose a candidate in a
partisan campaign is prohibited. 2 3  Recently, this issue has rarely been
litigated separately from the issue of coercion, discussed below. A district
court dealing with a wrongful termination suit found that a plaintiff had
"likely" violated this provision by allowing the mayor's name to be painted
on city buses and by going on campaign-related walking tours with the
mayor.214 On appeal, it was found to be "unclear" and irrelevant whether a
violation had occurred.215
Covered employees may not "directly or indirectly coerce" campaign
contributions of time or money from other covered employees.1 6 In 1990,
the Board approved an OSC recommendation that the director of the
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority and two colleagues should be
removed from their posts for coercing subordinates into making campaign
donations. 21 7 The Board reaffirmed "the long-established rule that it is
inherently coercive for a supervisor to ask a subordinate to contribute to a
political cause. 21 8 The employees testified that they "performed work...
because [a defendant, the employees' superior] asked them to do so and
they hoped to improve their standing if they agreed or feared the effect on
their jobs if they declined., 219 Another colleague violated the Hatch Act by
repeatedly discussing campaign contributions with employees "under
circumstances where [subordinate employees] reasonably felt coerced.,
220
3. Procedure and Penalties
Federal agencies involved in loaning or granting funds must report to
the OSC any activity of state and local officers that the agency has reason
to believe violates the Hatch Act. 2 1 If an OSC investigation uncovers
evidence of a violation of the law warranting prosecution, the OSC files a
written complaint for disciplinary action with the Board.222 The employee
has the right to contest the charges, including the right to a hearing before
213. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(1).
214. McKechnie v. McDermott, 595 F. Supp. 672, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
215. Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge Posner wrote,
"[b]ut we shall not have to get deeper into this thicket, except to note that no proceedings
have been brought against McKechnie for violation of the Hatch Act.").
216. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(2).
217. Special Counsel v. Gallagher, 44 M.S.P.B. 57 (1990).
218. Id. at 66.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 69.
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the Board.223
The Board determines if there has been a violation of the Act and if
removal is warranted as a punishment for violation.224 In part because the
federal government probably lacks the authority to direct a state or local
entity to dismiss an employee,225 the statute contemplates withholding
federal funds in lieu of dismissal of the employee.226 If the state or local
agency opts not to remove the offending employee, it faces withholding of
funds in the amount of two years of the employee's salary.
227
"'[C]andidacy for partisan political office is... one of the most
conspicuous and unequivocal violations of the Hatch Act,' usually
warranting removal unless strong mitigating factors are shown., 228 Courts
have repeatedly upheld Board orders for removal for employees who
"ignored repeated warnings" that their candidacies would violate the Hatch
Act.
229
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HATCH ACT AND ITS PREDECESSORS
The Hatch Act and its predecessors have uniformly been upheld
against constitutional challenges from covered government employees
invoking the First and Tenth Amendments, as well as other constitutional
provisions. Generally, in each Supreme Court case the majority stresses
the importance of governmental efficiency and impartiality, deferring to the
experience-based judgment of Congress and the president on how best to
achieve these goals. Dissenters begin their inquiry with the language and
doctrine of the First Amendment, arguing that the clause prohibits Hatch
Act-type restrictions on employees' political activity in the name of
government efficiency. In upholding the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court has
not fully addressed the possibility, advanced by some scholars, that the Act
is a restriction on government activity of the sort envisioned and mandated
by the First Amendment.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
224. Id.
225. 5 U.S.C. § 1506 (2000); see Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330
U.S. 127, 143 (1947) ("While the United States is not concerned with and has no power to
regulate local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms
upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.").
226. 5 U.S.C. § 1506 (2000).
227. 5 U.S.C. § 1506(a).
228. Williams v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 55 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Special Counsel v. Brondyk, 42 M.S.R.P. 333, 337 (1989)).
229. Id.
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A. Ex Parte Curtis
The constitutional validity of restrictions on the political activities of
government employees first came before the Supreme Court in Ex Parte
Curtis in 1882.230 The Curtis Court passed judgment on the
constitutionality231 of an 1876 law prohibiting executive branch employees
from any exchange of items for political purposes.232 The Court, citing a
series of similar laws over nearly 100 years, upheld the law as a
constitutional promotion of government efficiency.
The act was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress' power to "make
all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers that are
,,233234delegated. 233 The Court, minimizing the impact of the law, wrote that it
rested "on the same principle" as a series of restrictions on the outside
professional activities of government employees enacted over the years,
including in the first Congress. 215 "The evident purpose of congress in all
this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the
discharge of official duties," Justice Waite wrote. 236 "Clearly such a
purpose is within the just scope of legislative power, and it is not easy to
see why the act now under consideration does not come fairly within the
230. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882) ("[Tlhis is the first time the
constitutionality of such legislation [restricting the outside activities and rights of public
employees] has ever been presented for judicial determination.").
231. Id. at 371.
232. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 6, 19 Stat. 143, 169 (1876) ("That all executive
officers or employees of the United States not appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any
other officer or employee of the Government, any money or property or other thing of value
for political purposes; and any such officer or employee, who shall offend against the
provisions of this section shall be at once discharged from the service of the United States;
and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.").
233. Curtis, 106 U.S. at 372 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
234. Id. at 371-72.
The act is not one to prohibit all contributions of money or property by the
designated officers and employes [sic] of the United States for political
purposes. Neither does it prohibit them altogether from receiving or soliciting
money or property for such purposes. It simply forbids their receiving from or
giving to each other. Beyond this no restrictions are placed on any of their
political privileges.
Id.
235. Id. at 372. All Supreme Court opinions on restrictions of political activity of
government employees invoke this history as part of the basis for the restrictions'
constitutionality. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
557-63 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
236. Curtis, 106 U.S. at 373.
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legitimate means to such an end. 237  The Court also reasoned that
forbidding political donations promoted public employees' "feeling of
independence under the law conduc[ive] to faithful public service. 238
Justice Bradley dissented, arguing that the law went against the
"spirit" of the First Amendment.239 Bradley stressed that the law prevented
employees from making completely voluntary donations to political causes
they wanted to support.240  Bradley did not believe that the practice's
extended history deserved deference, writing, "[i]f similar laws have been
passed before, that does not make it right." 24'
B. United Public Workers v. Mitchell
The Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act against a First Amendment
challenge in Mitchell in 1947.242 Various executive branch employees
challenged the constitutionality of the provision that is codified today at 5
U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2)(A), which at the time prohibited all federal executive
branch employees from "tak[ing] any active part in political management
or in political campaigns. 243 The Mitchell Court advanced an indistinct but
highly deferential standard of review on the grounds that Congress and the
President are responsible for management of the civil service. "The
determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental
employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress,"24 Justice Reed
wrote for the Court. "Courts will interfere only when such regulation
passes beyond the general existing conception of governmental power.
That conception develops from practice, history, and changing educational,
social and economic conditions. 245
237. Id.
238. Id. at 373.
239. Id. at 377 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Bradley wrote:
[t]he freedom of speech and of the press, and that of assembling together to
consult upon and discuss matters of public interest, and to join in petitioning for
a redress of grievances, are expressly secured by the Constitution. The spirit of
this clause covers and embraces the right of every citizen to engage in such
discussions, and to promote the views of himself and his associates freely,
without being trammeled by inconvenient restrictions.
Id.
240. Id. at 376 ("It prevents the citizen from co-operating with other citizens of his own
choice in the promotion of his political views. To take an interest in public affairs... is
every citizen's duty.").
241. Id. at 378.
242. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
243. Id. at 82. The provision now applies only to further restricted employees.
244. Id. at 102.
245. Id.
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The Court conceded that the Hatch Act resulted in "a measure of
interference.., with what otherwise would be the freedom of the civil
servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 246 but concluded
that "it is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human
rights are not absolutes." '247 The restrictions on federal employees' political
activities were longstanding 248 and limited249 in the Court's view.
The Court looked to historical practice to determine the
constitutionality of Congress' action, as in Curtis,250 finding that "[t]he
regulation of such activities ... has the approval of long practice by the
Commission, court decisions upon similar problems and a large body of
informed public opinion."25'
The political branches' perception of a need for the Act was sufficient
to establish its constitutionality:
Congress and the President are responsible for an efficient public
service. If, in their judgment, efficiency may be best obtained by
prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics
as party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection.
Another Congress may determine that on the whole, limitations
on active political management by federal personnel are unwise.
The teaching of experience has evidently led Congress to enact
the Hatch Act provisions. To declare that the present supposed
evils of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to
redress would leave the nation impotent to deal with what many
sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic
system.252
246. Id. at 95. Plaintiffs also challenged the Act as a vague and indefinite deprivation of
liberty violating the Fifth Amendment.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 79, 80, 96, 99, 102-103.
249. Id. at 100. There is a:
wide range of public activities with which there is no interference by the
legislation. It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active
participation in political management and political campaigns. Expressions,
public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest,
not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long as the
Government employee does not direct his activities toward party success.
Id.
250. The Court wrote that in fact, "[t]he conviction that an actively partisan
governmental personnel threatens good administration has deepened since Ex parte Curtis."
Id. at 97-98.
251. Id. at 102-03.
252. Id. at 99 (citations omitted). The Court later repeated this rationale:
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Mitchell's deference extended to its examination of the law's breadth.
Poole, the lone plaintiff granted standing to challenge the Act's
constitutionality by the Court, 53 was a technical worker with little if any
authority over policy or contact with the public. 54 The Court supplied its
own possible rationales for the law as written. 25 Regardless of the Act's
arguable overbreadth as applied to any one employee, "[e]vidently what
Congress feared was the cumulative effect on employee morale of political
activity by all employees who could be induced to participate actively.2 56
Given the "long practice by the Commission, court decisions upon similar
problems and a large body of informed public opinion," the Court could not
"say with such a background that these restrictions are unconstitutional. 257
The Court upheld the Act against various specific constitutional
challenges. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments had little reach on the
theory advanced by the Court.258 It noted that "[t]he essential rights of the
First Amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for
order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a
mockery .,259
Justice Douglas dissented, as did Justice Black joined by Justice
Rutledge. Both dissents argued that all of the petitioners were threatened
with immediate and irreparable harm, and thus that all of them had standing
to sue.260 Both Black and Douglas expressed concern over the number of
Congress and the administrative agencies have authority over the discipline and
efficiency of the public service. When actions of civil servants in the judgment
of Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service, legislation
to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is required. The
Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to this need. We cannot say with such a
background that these restrictions are unconstitutional.
Id. at 103.
253. Id. at 86-93. Poole was the only plaintiff to have actually violated the Act. The
others claimed that the Act chilled their future activity. The dissenters concluded that the
other plaintiffs should have been granted standing. Id. at 109, 115-20.
254. See id. at 101 ("The complaint states that [Poole] is a roller in the mint. We take it
this is a job calling for the qualities of a skilled mechanic and that it does not involve contact
with the public.").
255. See id. at 101 ("Congress may have thought that Government employees are handy
elements for leaders in political policy to use in building a political machine.").
256. Id. at 101.
257. Id. at 103.
258. See id. at 96 ("[W]hen objection is made that the exercise of a federal power
infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be
directed toward the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken."). The
Court addressed Tenth Amendment objections to the Hatch Act's application to state and
local officials in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947),
discussed below.
259. Id. at 95.
260. Id. at 109, 116-18.
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workers affected by the restrictions and the specific activities in which they
were denied permission to participate. 26 ' Government employees were not
"second class citizens," Black and Douglas stressed.262
Justice Black argued that the Hatch Act's restrictions on political
activity went far beyond the restrictions upheld in Ex parte Curtis.
263
Congress should "punish the coercers ' '264 rather than millions of federal
employees because of the risk of corruption or coercion, Black wrote.
Justice Douglas acknowledged that political rights may need "to be
qualified by the larger requirements of modern democratic government,"
but argued that such "restrictions should be narrowly and selectively
drawn. 265
C. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission
The Court held that the Hatch Act provisions applying to state and
local officials did not violate the Tenth Amendment in Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission,266 a case decided the same day as
Mitchell. Oklahoma cited the "possible forfeiture[s] of state office" in
arguing that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.267 The Court upheld
the Act's method of enforcement, saying that "[w]hile the United States is
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate local political activities as
such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its
money allotments to states shall be disbursed., 261 Such provisions in
federal laws were "not unusual" and unobjectionable.269
D. United States Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers
In Letter Carriers,27° the Supreme Court reversed a district court
holding that the Hatch Act's statutory definition of "political activity" was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that later Supreme Court
261. Id. at 106-09, 121-23.
262. Id. at 111, 124.
263. See id. at 112 ("Indeed, the Curtis decision seems implicitly to have rested on the
assumption that many political activities of government employees, beyond merely voting
and speaking secretly, and would not, and could not under the Constitution, be impaired by
the legislation there at issue.").
264. Id. at 113 n.8.
265. Id. at 126.
266. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
267. Id. at 142.
268. Id. at 143.
269. Id. at 144. The Court also rejected Oklahoma's claim that the CSC's ruling was an
invalid arbitrary and capricious finding of a violation by the state employee at issue. Id. at
144-45.
270. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
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holdings had undermined Mitchell.2"' After reviewing the history of
political restrictions on government employees,272 Letter Carriers expressly
reaffirmed Mitchell. 273 The Court found that the interests of the
government, determined by reference to previous cases and the Act's
legislative history, outweighed the interests of the employees at issue.274
The Hatch Act's 1940 clause defining "partisan political activity" in terms
of previous CSC decisions was held to incorporate a restatement of these
decisions rather than, as the district court had found, every conflicting CSC
275pronouncement.
Like the Mitchell Court, the Letter Carriers Court viewed the Hatch
Act as presenting a conflict between obviously important interests of the
government and the First Amendment rights of employees, with the
government interests sufficient to vindicate the Act. 276 "Neither the right to
associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute,"
Justice White wrote for the Court.277 The government had an interest in
maintaining a bureaucracy that operated "without bias or favoritism,
278
was perceived to do SO, 2 79 and was not "employed to build a powerful,
invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine., 20 Employees' interests
were not disregarded by the Act, the Court pointed out. Citing legislative
history, Justice White wrote that the Act helped to "make sure that
Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or
tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order
to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own
beliefs. 28s
Letter Carriers rejected the district court's holding that the Hatch Act
271. Id. at 553-54.
272. Id. at 557-63. The Court maintained that it deferred not only to Congress, but to
"the judgment of history." Id. at 557.
273. See id. at 556 (stating that the Court "unhesitatingly reaffirm[ed] the Mitchell
holding that Congress had, and has, the power to prevent" federal employees from
participating in a range of kinds of partisan political conduct). "[T]he discussion in [Letter
Carriers] essentially restated in balancing terms our approval of the Hatch Act in Public
Workers v. Mitchell .. " United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,
467 (1995).
274. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-67 (discussing the government's decision to
limit partisan political activities by federal employees).
275. Id. at 572.
276. See id. at 554 ("As the District Court recognized, the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act's ban on taking an active part in the political management or political campaigns has
been here before.").
277. Id. at 567.
278. Id. at 565.
279. See id. (asserting that the government had an interest in preserving "confidence in
the system of representative Government... [from being] eroded to a disastrous extent.").
280. Id.
281. Id. at 566.
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and its regulations were vague and overbroad. The Court looked to the
regulations interpreting the Act, acknowledging that "[t]here might be
quibbles about the meaning of taking an 'active part in managing' or about
'actively participating in... fund-raising' or about the meaning of
becoming a 'partisan' candidate for office, ' 82 but concluded that the
wording was clear enough. "[T]here are limitations in the English
language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief., 283 The
provisions at issue were "set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply
with." 2 4 To illustrate the clarity of the provisions, the Court set out a series
285of specific activities prohibited and permitted by the regulations.
The Court looked to legislative history to find that the Act's provision,
now codified at Section 7323(b)(4), defining "active part in political
management or in a political campaign" in terms of CSC decisions issued
before July 19, 1940, was neither vague nor overbroad. 86 The district court
had held that this provision unconstitutionally adopted numerous, and
sometimes contradictory, CSC findings into law. 287  The Supreme Court
concluded instead that the provision was clearly "intended to deprive the
Civil Service Commission of rulemaking power in the sense of exercising a
subordinate legislative role ... ,288 The Act adopted a restatement of CSC
decisions rather than every ruling, the Court found, referring to the Act's
legislative history. 89 Civil Service Commission decisions and regulations
issued after the Act were "necessarily anticipated" by Congress, and were
"within the bounds of... the 1940 rules., 290 The Act and its regulations
were not overbroad because the restrictions were "clearly stated" and
282. Id. at577-78.
283. Id. at 578-79.
284. Id. at 579. The Court also held that the district court erred in voiding any more of
the law than the provision found unconstitutionally vague.
285. Id. at 579. A Supreme Court case decided the same day as Letter Carriers upheld
5-4 the provisions of Oklahoma's "little Hatch Act" restricting its own employees. Justice
Stewart switched sides, voting with the three Letter Carriers dissenters. He joined Justice
Brennan's dissent focusing on the state regulations' failure to clarify the state statute's
ambiguous terms. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 621, 624-27 (1973).
286. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 568-76.
287. See id. at 571 ("[T]he District Court held the prohibition against taking an active
part in political management and political campaigns to be itself an insufficient guide to
employee behavior .... ).
288. Id. at 571. In 1940, as Congress deprived the CSC of rulemaking power, it granted
the agency authority to investigate and enforce state and local violations. See also Act of
July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, § 4, 54 Stat. 767 (1940).
289. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 572 ("It is also apparent, in our view, that the rules
that had evolved over the years from repeated adjudications were subject to sufficiently
clear and summary statement for the guidance of classified service.").
290. Id. at 575.
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related to the problem Congress intended to target.
291
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
The dissent focused on the "ambiguity" of certain regulations, arguing that
"the critical phrases lack precision." 292 Justice Douglas noted that First
Amendment doctrine had advanced since Mitchell.293 He advocated a more
restrictive view of the government's power to limit political activity: "In
the areas of speech, like religion, it is of no concern what the employee
says in private to his wife or to the public in Constitution Hall."
294
E. Other Cases
The Supreme Court has discussed the Hatch Act in analysis of other
laws, offering some insight into how the Hatch Act might fit into
developing First Amendment doctrine. Lower courts have rejected less
common constitutional objections to the Hatch Act.
After Mitchell, the Supreme Court elevated the level of scrutiny it
applied to restrictions on the First Amendment rights of government
employees. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that "the
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. ' 295 The Court offered a
balancing test: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests" of the employee as citizen and the interests of the government
as employer, "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. 296 Factors in the analysis included the relevance of
the speech to the job, the damage the speech caused to the employee's
"proper performance of his daily duties, 297 and the interference with the
government function at issue.29 s
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), the
Court struck down limitations on receipt of honoraria by federal employees
at the GS-15 level and below. 299 The NTEU Court raised scrutiny for the
291. Id. at 580.
292. Id. at 596.
293. See id. at 597 ("[W]hat may have been unclear to some in Mitchell should by now
be abundantly clear to all. We deal here with a First Amendment right to speak, to propose,
to publish, to petition Government, to assemble."). Justice Douglas also pointed out that
since Mitchell, "a host of decisions have illustrated the need for narrowly drawn statutes that
touch First Amendment rights." Id. at 598.
294. Id. at 597.
295. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 572.
298. Id. at 573.
299. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
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statute because it affected "citizen comment upon matters of public
concern... made outside the workplace, and involv[ing] content largely
unrelated to their government employment,"3°° and because "this ban chills
potential speech before it happens."' ' Specifically, the government had to
"show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future
expression are outweighed by that expression's necessary impact on the
actual operation of the Government." 302 This the government could not do,
because the "vast majority of the speech at issue in this case does not
involve the subject matter of Government employment and takes place
outside the workplace.,
303
All nine justices appeared to be willing to uphold the Hatch Act, either
as a manner of protecting employees' rights, °4 or as a reasonable balance
of the government's interest in avoiding "impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety" with employees' interest in publishing and speaking on
unrelated topics. 30 5  Citing Letter Carriers' concern that the Hatch Act
would help keep employees "free from pressure," the NTEU Court
concluded that "the Hatch Act aimed to protect employees' rights, notably
their right to free expression, rather than to restrict those rights. 3°6
Additionally, there had been "demonstrated ill effects of Government
employees' partisan political activities" leading up to adoption of the Hatch
Act, in contrast to the situation in NTEU.30 7 The honoraria limitations
imposed a cost not only on federal employees, but also on the "the public's
right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written
and said,"30 8 the Court found. The honoraria limitations extended to
messages that have "nothing to do with their jobs and do[ ] not even
300. Id. at 466.
301. Id. at 468.
302. Id. at 455 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
303. Id. at 470.
304. Id. at471-72.
305. Id. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 471 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent defending the
government's ability to ban the honoraria at issue consistent with the First Amendment,
termed the majority's discussion "a strange characterization" of the Hatch Act given its
restrictions and punishments for violators. Id. at 498. The dissent noted, accurately, that the
majority overlooked the primary justifications for the Hatch Act offered in Letter Carriers:
"Although protection of employees from pressure to perform political chores certainly was a
concern of the Hatch Act, it was by no means the only, or even the most important,
concern." Id. at 493 (internal reference omitted).
307. Id. at 471; see also id. at 483 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[W]e upheld provisions of the Hatch Act against a First Amendment challenge only
after canvassing nearly a century of concrete experience with the evils of the political spoils
system.") (citations omitted).
308. Id. at 470 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976)).
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Some language has suggested that the history of partisan political
activity of government employees has led to a particular exception to
expected First Amendment scrutiny. In Federal Communications
Commission v. League of Women Voters, the Court stressed that history had
proven the need for the Hatch Act, writing that it "evolved over a century
of governmental experience with less restrictive alternatives that proved to
be inadequate to maintain the effective operation of government."3 '
The Sixth Circuit held that the Hatch Act's imposition of different
penalties on state and federal employees did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it was a rational response by Congress to
diminished federal power regarding state and local employees.3 ' The
Third Circuit in Merle v. United States 12 rejected a claim that the Hatch
Act, by restricting the rights of some citizens to run for office, violates the
Qualifications Clause313 of the Constitution. After concluding that the
Hatch Act prevents covered state employees from running for federal
offices, the court noted that covered employees could run if they resign
from their jobs.3 4 In Burrus, the Second Circuit held that a union bulletin
board in an interior work area was a non-public forum, subject to
reasonable regulation.
31 5
F. The Hatch Act, the First Amendment, and Campaigning in Federal
Facilities
The Hatch Act prohibits federal employees from engaging in partisan
activity while in public buildings.316 In cases when the government has
opened a building to public debate and discussion, these bans can present
questions under First Amendment limits on the government's ability to
limit speech in public areas. The OSC issued an advisory opinion on
309. Id. at 465.
310. See Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400
(1984). The statutory provision at issue in that case, forbidding noncommercial educational
stations that received federal funds to engage in editorializing, was found to violate the First
Amendment. Id. at 395.
311. See Alexander v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474, 485 (6th Cir.
1999).
312. See Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2003).
313. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
314. See Merle, 351 F.3d at 96-97.
315. Burrus v. Vegliante, 336 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
316. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2000) ("An employee may not engage in political activity in
any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an individual employed
or holding office in the Government of the United States or any agency or instrumentality
thereof.").
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campaigning in federal facilities.317 In particular, there has been some
concern about restricting partisan activities in federal buildings that are
frequently used by non-employees, such as facilities intended for use by
veterans, National Park Service sites, and visitors' centers at these sites.
Under the First Amendment, government restrictions of speech in a
public forum, such as a sidewalk or street, will be upheld if they are
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open
alternative channels of communication. 319 Content-based restrictions will
be upheld only if the government can show that the regulation is narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest.3 20 Restrictions in a designated
public forum, an area that the government has designated as a place of
expressive activity opened to the public or certain speakers or for the
discussion of certain subjects,32" ' are subject to the same scrutiny as
regulations of a public forum. 322 A state can choose to close off an area
that formerly served as a limited public forum. 323  The government can
restrict speech in a nonpublic forum "as long as a regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."3 24
Determination of the bounds of the forum at issue in a given case will
325depend on the circumstances. Still, some broad conclusions about
different kinds of facilities are possible. Application of the Hatch Act to
some facilities open to the public, such as facilities for veterans, raises few
concerns because these areas have not been designated as areas for
expressive activity.326
Opening a building to some speakers does not automatically create a
317. Letter by Ana Galindo-Marrone, Chief, Hatch Act Unit (Aug. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/federal/fha-35.htm.
318. Hatch Act prohibitions are limited to activity in a "room or building," and would
not reach activity at outdoor facilities such as parks. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2).
319. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States Postal
Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
320. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
321. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985);
Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194,
1196 (9th Cir. 1987).
322. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
323. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
324. See id. at 37.
325. When a speaker seeks limited access to a public building, courts will perform a
"tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the
government property" as needed. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
326. Id. at 802, 805.
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designated public forum.32 7 Evidence that historic buildings have been
used for political events may show that there is a government policy of
opening these facilities for expressive activity, creating a designated public
forum. Even when a designated public forum is created, only "entities of
similar character" can also claim a right to access. 328 The Hatch Act would
yield to First Amendment requirements that a federal building designated
as a public forum be open to similar speakers engaging in similar activities;
however, to comply with the Hatch Act, governments may close to general
discussion areas that had formerly been designated public fora.
G. The Hatch Act: A First Amendment-Mandated Statute?
Courts have analyzed the Act as an encroachment on First
Amendment rights of government employees. The Hatch Act, though, also
protects the public's First Amendment rights. 329 Laws restricting the free
speech rights of government employees are subject to a balancing test,
evaluating the interests of the government as employer and the interests of
the employee as a citizen.330 The interests of the government in the Hatch
Act include promoting impartiality and.fairness in administering the law."'
From the perspective of the public, this can be restated, more forcefully, as
an interest in protecting the public's due process and free speech rights
from partisan enforcement of laws.
If the public fears that a partisan bureaucracy conducts investigations
and prosecutions on the basis of party affiliation or expression of views,
there is a chilling effect on the freedoms of speech and association.
Partisan government could also make demands for partisan support or
favors from the public, as they have of subordinate employees. On a
broader scale, a bureaucracy pursuing the goals of a party rather than of
elected officials renders government less accountable to voters.
This additional rationale for the Hatch Act, implied but not examined
in Letter Carriers, is an additional reason for the Act's validity. Given that
Congress may not make a law abridging freedom of speech, or of the press,
or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, it cannot maintain a
bureaucracy that works the same infringement. On this view, the Hatch
Act defends the rights protected by the First Amendment.332
327. Perry, 460 U.S., at 48 (holding that "selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum").
328. Id. at 47.
329. See JOHN R. BOLTON, THE HATCH ACT: A CIvIL LIBERTARIAN DEFENSE (1976).
330. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
331. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65
(1973) (listing this rationale first among equals).
332. Note that, since the amendments passed in 1993, the Act covers a limited number of
activities of off-duty employees.
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There are grounds to criticize this conception of the Hatch Act. Even
scholars who defend the Hatch Act on grounds that it protects the public
have conceded that "[t]here are... very few indications that Congress in
1939 believed that protection of the individual citizen was a major reason
for supporting the act." '333 Still, protecting the public has been a concern of
Congress in debates about the Hatch Act.334 Given the expansion of federal
power and activity since 1939, the risk of government bureaucracy
infringement of the public's First Amendment rights has expanded in ways
that even the Hatch Act's framers did not fully appreciate.
The idea that the Hatch Act is justified by history is only necessary if
the Act is viewed as an infringement on First Amendment rights; this
argument is unnecessary if the Act is properly regarded as protecting those
rights. Letter Carriers offered a lengthy history of restrictions on political
activity in support of its conclusion that it was the "judgment of history"
that the government had a strong interest behind the Hatch Act.335
Similarly, League of Women Voters characterized the Act as having
"evolved over a century of governmental experience. 33 6  Rather than
reflecting a "reasonable" prerogative of government to limit some rights
protected by the First Amendment, as indicated in Mitchell, Letter
Carriers, and the NTEU dissent, the Hatch Act can be regarded as a
limitation on government power as mandated by the First Amendment.337
333. BOLTON, supra note 329, at 16-17.
334. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565 (citing "fair and effective government" as a
rationale for the Hatch Act). Opponents to the amendments in 1993 cited protecting the
public from coercion as a reason to avoid amending the law. See also 139 Cong. Rec. H761
(1993) (Statement by Rep. Wolf) (arguing that even well-intentioned employees could have
a coercive effect on the public if they engaged in off-duty partisan activity).
335. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 557.
336. Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S.
364, 401 n.27 (1984).
337. For the proposition that the First Amendment limits the power of the government to
interfere with public debate, see U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); see also U.S. v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (stating that under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause, "[tihe citizen is entitled to seek out or reject certain
ideas or influences without Government interference or control."); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) ("The
constitutional right of free expression is... intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us... in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."
(citations and quotations omitted); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) ("The
policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and the
guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent the censorship of
the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such
free and general discussion of public matters." (citations and quotations omitted). For the
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This interpretation is in keeping with the insights of the Framers on the
capacity of partisanship in the government to infringe on the rights of the
public.
IV. THE HATCH ACT AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
The Hatch Act's restrictions on political activities of government
employees can be seen as a modem adaptation of the Framers' efforts to
guard against faction in the government. The "faction" described in The
Federalist Papers would today be rendered "partisanship." '33 8 While The
Federalist Papers defended the structures of government in the
Constitution as a means of containing faction, the Hatch Act instead limits
partisan activity as a matter of law and policy. This section will explore the
rationale for checking governmental partisanship as expressed in The
Federalist Papers and as reflected in the Hatch Act.
A. The Federalist Papers and Controlling Faction
Madison and Hamilton believed that faction was an inevitable
consequence of human nature,33 9 unlike others who believed that
enlightened statesmen deliberating in an open-minded manner on the public
good could determine proper policy. 340 Madison defined faction as "a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community." 34' Faction, then, was
proposition that the Hatch Act implements the obligation of the government to refrain from
infringing on public debate, see JOHN R. BOLTON, THE HATCH ACT: A CIVIL LIBERTARIAN
DEFENSE (1976).
338. See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking
Federalist No. 76 on the Senate's Role in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 235, 247 (2004) (explaining, "Madison clearly uses 'party' as a synonym for
'faction' throughout the essay.").
339. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more
laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose
the right side of a question."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man"); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform
to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.").
340. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540
(1988) ("The characteristically republican belief in deliberative democracy continues to
influence both legal doctrine and contemporary evaluations of the political process.").
341. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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undesirable because of its adverse impact on the rights of others. If the
powers of governance were too narrowly concentrated, Madison wrote, it
would be easier for a faction to "concert and carry into effect schemes of
,,142oppression.
Hamilton and Madison advocated the three-branch, federal system of
government as the best way to achieve effective governance while
controlling the negative impact of faction.343 Today, these observations are
nearly universally accepted.
Some of The Federalist Papers' predictions and assumptions proved
to be less prescient as centuries passed. Neither Hamilton nor Madison
foresaw, for instance, the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment or the
industrial revolution's globalization of economic activity and contribution
to the nationalization of American politics, much less the Great Depression
and the New Deal's federal government response.3" Madison wrote in The
Federalist 51 that the executive branch would be weak relative to the
legislature. 345 Hamilton also wrongly believed that the federal government
would lack the public support and the inclination to gain power over such
matters of local concern as "[t]he administration of private justice between
the citizens of the same State [and] the supervision of agriculture ....
States would command greater loyalty than the federal government in the
same manner that "a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large."347
342. Id. at 81.
343. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the advantages of a federal system of government), THE FEDERALIST No.
51, at 320-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the advantages
of both the division of federal power into separate branches and a federal system.).
344. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 453-72 (1995) (describing increased interstate commercial activity and
a new legal understanding that substantive due process was increasingly regarded as an
enforcement of policy preferences rather than impartial legal judgment as rationales for a
changed understanding of the Commerce Clause). Other scholars have come to different
conclusions. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing
that the high level of public support and mobilization during the New Deal justified changes
in understanding of the Constitution just as much as an amendment); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (maintaining that
there was no textual basis, and thus no justification, for the changes of the New Deal);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) (calling the New Deal
a return to the understanding of the Commerce Clause put forth by Justice Marshall).
345. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(Madison or Hamilton wrote that the Constitution sought to address this by "some qualified
connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger
department," referring to the links between the president and the Senate, such as in making
treaties and the vice president holding the office of president of the Senate.).
346. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
347. Id. at 119.
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Therefore, it would "always be far more easy for the State governments to
encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to
encroach upon the State authorities. 348 Hamilton also believed that those
serving in the federal government would not be inclined to assert control
over matters of local concern in the first place. "The regulation of the mere
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition," Hamilton wrote. 349 The federal government would draw those
interested in broader matters such as "[c]ommerce, finance, negotiation,
and war."
350
Today, these assumptions do not hold nearly the sway they did in the
late eighteenth century. The federal executive is the most powerful branch
of the most powerful level of American government. The federal
government regulates numerous matters such as "the supervision of
agriculture" envisioned by Hamilton to be the purview of local
governments.35 1
As Hamilton and Madison would have predicted, the control over a
large number of government workers and programs by the executive led to
abuses. Changes in American governance demanded new, more specific
safeguards to supplement the structural checks on faction.3 52
1. "Partisan Activity" in the Bureaucracy and "Faction"
"Partisan activity" in the bureaucracy, as opposed to "faction,"
required the policy adjustment of the Hatch Act rather than the structural
design discussed in The Federalist Papers.353 The Federalist Papers dealt
348. Id. at 119 ("[T]he people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards
their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that
principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter."). The national
scale of economic activity, and the depth of the dislocation during the Great Depression, led
the federal government to become the primary regulator of matters Hamilton considered to
be of purely local concern. See Lessig, supra note 344, at 453-72.
349. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. For a competing view on the motives underlying the Hatch Act, see Rafael Gely &
Timothy D. Chandler, Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities: Good Government
or Partisan Politics?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 775, 808-09 (2000) (citing uniform Republican
voting for the Act in 1939, and considerably stronger Democratic than Republican support
for the Hatch Act amendments passed by Congress in 1976, 1990, and the amendments
signed into law in 1993). The authors conclude that "when enacting laws restricting the
political activities of political employees, legislators respond to some underlying motivation
as represented by the individual legislator's party alliance, rather than some abstract concept
of 'good government."' Id. at 810. This interpretation captures some of the partisanship in
the debates over the Act, but it also overlooks the depth of emotion displayed in the debates
over restrictions on the activities of government employees.
353. See discussion supra Part.IV.
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with faction in the composition of government and formulation and
application of laws. The Constitution addressed the broadest of these
concerns. The Hatch Act, enacted during an era of expansion of federal
power and political dominance by one party, addressed only application of
laws and policy. The Act's authors responded to scandals involving
coercion of subordinates and misuse of positions of authority for partisan
gain. 4 The Hatch Act is a check on faction as a matter of law and policy
rather than structure of the federal three-branch system of checks and
balances.
V. RATIONALES FOR THE HATCH ACT
Defenders of the Hatch Act have offered a number of rationales for
limiting the appearance of partisanship within the government. Preventing
corruption, ensuring a professional civil service, preserving respect for the
government, and protecting employees from being coerced into political
activity are the most cited reasons for the Act. While these rationales are
here described separately, they are tightly interrelated.
A. Fighting Corruption and Partisan Machines
The political activities of the new executive agencies and departments,
especially the Works Progress Administration, led Congress to enact the
Hatch Act. As the Supreme Court explained,
perhaps the immediate occasion for the enactment of the Hatch
Act in 1939... was the conviction that the rapidly expanding
Government work force should not be employed to build a
powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine...
[and that] substantial barriers should be raised against the party in
power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the
thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid
for at public expense, to man its political structure and political
campaigns.355
While some observers have defended political machines,356 Congress
354. See sources cited supra, at note 33.
355. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565-66 (1973).
The Court drew from legislative history in reaching its determination of the intent of
Congress.
356. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 102-09 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Corruption and inefficiency, rather than abridgement of liberty, have been the
major criticisms leading to enactment of the civil service laws-for the very good reason
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and the Supreme Court have expressed the belief that partisan machines in
government administration cause the problems addressed below.
B. Ensuring a Professional Civil Service to Protect Citizens
Preventing government employees from engaging in political activity
ensures that they may not be retained or rejected on the basis of their
political activities. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this as a
constitutionally valid reason for Congress to have enacted the Hatch Act.357
As the Supreme Court explained, "Congress recognizes danger to the
service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement
and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through
political connections." '358 A civil service dedicated to carrying out policy
formulated by elected officials makes those officials more accountable to
voters .359
As discussed previously, the Hatch Act prevents an unprofessional
bureaucracy from infringing on the First Amendment rights of the public.
In the eyes of some analysts, protecting the rights of citizens is the decisive
factor in favor of the Hatch Act. 36°  "When government bureaucracy
becomes partisan, it intrudes in the marketplace of ideas, 36' in the words of
one scholar, invoking Justice Holmes' famous dictum.
3 62
that the patronage system does not have as harsh an effect upon conscience, expression, and
association as the Court SUGGESTS."); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 124-36 (3d ed. 1968).
357. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947)
("The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring
those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political
partisanship."); see also Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565 ("A major thesis of the Hatch Act
is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is
essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties,
not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office
on partisan political tickets.").
358. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98 (1947).
359. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65. The Hatch Act helps ensure that the civil
service will "administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in
accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the
law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against
any political party or group or the members thereof." Id.
360. See BOLTON, supra note 329. Bolton rejects fighting corruption and maintaining
professionalism as adequate rationales for the Act's restrictions, but concludes that
protecting the rights of citizens justifies the Act. Bolton also noted concern that liberalizing
the Hatch Act-as the 1993 amendments did-would leave employees vulnerable to
coercion by unions.
361. Lydia Segal, Can We Fight The New Tammany Hall?: Difficulties of Prosecuting
Political Patronage and Suggestions for Reform, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 507, 527 (1998).
362. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing
the general belief in the United States that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
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C. Preserving the Appearance of Nonpartisanship and Respect for
Governance
A bureaucracy bent on partisan advantage rather than impartial
application of laws and policies can diminish the government's
accountability and respectability in the eyes of voters. The Supreme Court
explained, "it is not only important that the Government and its employees
in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they
appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. 363
D. Preserving the Rights of Employees Not to be Coerced into Political
Activity or Making Political Donations
Hatch Act supporters have argued that restricting the ability of
employees to participate in partisan political activity would protect their
rights overall, given the abuses and coercion in the past.364  The
philosophical debate over the First Amendment's guarantee of government
employees' rights versus its guarantee of government restraint in the arena
of political discussion becomes an empirical question. Experience led
Congress to conclude that the restrictions promoted workers' liberty. Said
one Congressman, "I am for [the Act] because I sincerely believe that it is
restoring to millions of WPA workers who have been coerced and abused
in recent years their rights as American citizens. 365 Some have criticized
the 1993 amendments, arguing that they are similar to other anti-coercion
laws that, by forbidding only explicit threats or promises, do little to thwart
a coercive atmosphere.366
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Holmes wrote in opposition to a conviction for
printing and distributing seditious material, not in support of a law that prevented
government employees from engaging in partisan activities).
363. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565.
364. See, e.g., 84 CONG. REc. 9598 (1939) (Statement by Rep. Taylor) (claiming that
"[i]t will be urged by some that this legislation will interfere with personal liberty. Well, if
the passage of this measure will secure those on Government relief from becoming the prey
of political parasites and highjackers [sic] by interfering with their 'liberty' to coerce and
exploit, then that is the strongest possible argument for its speedy enactment."); Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566 (The Hatch Act was intended "to further serve the goal that
employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political
performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free
from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform
political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own
beliefs.") (citations omitted).
365. 86 CONG. REc. 9632 (1939), (remarks of Rep. Green).
366. See Segal, supra note 361 at 529-31 (discussing a case arising under 18 U.S.C. §
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The Hatch Act, limiting the influence of partisanship in the federal
workplace and application of laws, is an extension of the founders' views
on the importance of containing faction to a changing federal government.
The rise in the personnel and reach of the executive branch resulted in
misuse of funds for partisan purposes. Rather than a new structural check
on the powers of the executive, Congress created legal limits on the
activities of executive employees to curb coercion and misuse of funds.
VI. EMPIRICAL REVIEW
The charts below show the data collected by the OSC on Hatch Act
matters.
Federal Federal Federal Federal
FY Matters prosecutions resigns withdrawals
1992 72 10 6 4
1993 78 7 2 2
1994 59 5 3 2
1995 48 4 1 1
1996 54 0 3 1
1997 47 1 3 0
1998 36 4 2 3
1999 28 0 2 2
2000 51 8 3 5
2001 108 4 3 7
2002 61 2 6 7
2003 79 4 4 8
2004 105 3 5 8
601 in which town council members "had been convicted for systematically rewarding
Democratic party supporters with town jobs"). The convictions were overturned on the
grounds that there must be an explicit promise of a job for a political supporter or an explicit
threat that workers who did not support the campaign would be fired. Segal concluded that
"when patronage is at its most oppressive, political bosses need to be the least explicit." Id.
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ST/LOC ST/LOC ST/LOC ST/LOC
FY matters prosecutions resigns withdrawals
1992 86 17 10 5
1993 93 2 4 2
1994 81 1 5 4
1995 62 1 2 1
1996 54 1 4 3
1997 32 1 4 6
1998 51 2 3 2
1999 50 1 2 2
2000 53 2 8 7
2001 97 1 9 15
2002 122 1 8 6
2003 92 0 10 10
2004 96 3 6 8
FY Matters prosecutions resign/withdraw % action
1992 158 27 25 0.329113924
1993 171 9 10 0.111111111
1994 140 6 14 0.142857143
1995 110 5 5 0.090909091
1996 108 1 11 0.111111111
1997 79 2 13 0.189873418
1998 87 6 10 0.183908046
1999 78 1 8 0.115384615
2000 104 10 23 0.317307692
2001 205 5 34 0.190243902
2002 183 3 27 0.163934426
2003 171 4 32 0.210526316
2004 201 6 27 0.1641791
The fiscal year begins on October 1 of the previous calendar year, so
presidential election campaigns are split into the calendar year in which
they take place and the previous year. The OSC does not gather data on the
party affiliation of reported offenses.
While variations could be attributable to any number of unrecorded
20051
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factors given the small numbers, some patterns do emerge from the data.
Candidacy is the most frequent topic at the federal, state, and local levels.
There was a significant increase in all matters in 2000-2001, apparently to
a permanently higher level, especially regarding state and local candidacy.
This followed a decrease in Hatch Act matters from 1993 until 1997. The
decrease extended to activities such as state and local candidacy, which
saw no change in the law. Many complaints are disproved, or are about
persons or employees over whom the OSC lacks jurisdiction. The OSC
receives a roughly equal number of federal and state and local matters,
though the balance fluctuates greatly. Generally, the OSC refers for
prosecution more federal than state and local Hatch Act offenders.
Presidential election years generally, but not always, see an increase in
matters.
The effects of the 1993 amendments to the law permitting an
increased level of political activity are unclear. There was a decline in
Hatch Act complaints across the board in the early to mid-1990s. Matters
have since recovered to pre-1993 levels. The decline extended to some
state and local Hatch Act matters, so it may not be attributable to the 1993
amendments, which did not affect the state and local part of the Act.
Unsurprisingly, complaints about soliciting votes and endorsing
candidates dropped off after 1993, as these activities became legal for a
large swath of employees. There were no immediately apparent negative
consequences of the 1993 amendments, as use of authority matters
remained constant. Partisan candidacy matters dropped off after 1993,
though the ban was unaffected by the 1993 reform. Campaign
management matters remained stable, even though the provisions were
liberalized.
Patterns of enforcement seem to explain changes in the level of
complaints much better than do changes in the law. Roughly fifteen
percent of complaints lead to an action of some sort-a prosecution,
withdrawal from a race, or resignations from employment. This number
varies widely. Increasing rates of action correspond with increased
numbers of complaints. For example, in fiscal year 2000, nearly a third of
the complaints filed led to prosecutions, withdrawals, or resignations, up
from twelve percent the previous year. In fiscal year 2002, the number of
complaints almost doubled. The action rate was generally low between
fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 1997, and the number of complaints fell by
more than fifty percent.
Complaints under the federal Hatch Act have risen in recent years.
There was an increase in fiscal year 2001 in the number of complaints
about unlawful activity while in a government building or car, and while on
duty or wearing insignia. This statistic was not recorded until 1999. Its
surge was due in part to increased use of e-mail to engage in political
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activity. Complaints about misuse of authority have also risen.
This trend is likely to continue as new technologies offer ways to
make partisan campaigning and, as a result, violating the Hatch Act easier
to do. Continued outreach efforts by the OSC will be necessary to avert
widespread violations. Updating and disseminating new regulations would
also help keep employees informed of the prohibitions of the Hatch Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Hatch Act helps protect the rights of government employees and
the public's right to an impartial bureaucracy that does not chill its right to
free expression. This somewhat neglected rationale for the Hatch Act is
mindful of The Federalist Papers-that unchecked partisanship within the
government will endanger the public's rights.367 The Supreme Court has
upheld the Hatch Act as a valid means of pursuing the goal of an efficient
bureaucracy. More recently, the Court has endorsed the Act as protective
of employees' rights and necessitated by history, despite increased judicial
scrutiny of restrictions on government employees and federal government-
funded entities.
There might be some benefit to a reexamination of Hatch Act
regulations to account for changed technology. Hatch Act complaints have
been on the rise in recent years, due in large part to the rise of e-mail. With
consistent enforcement and increased education to federal and state and
local employees, it is hoped that the future will see a decrease in
prosecutions.
367. See discussion supra Part.IV.
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